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ARTICLES 
CHILDREN OF DISTANT FATHERS: SKETCHING AN 
ETHOS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 
GENE R. NICHOL* 
CIVILIZATION [MAY BE JUDGED BY] THE DEGREE OF DIVERSITY ATTAINED 
AND THE DEGREE OF UNITY RETAINED .. 1 
-W.H. AUDEN 
In this article, Professor Gene R. Nichol argues for a constitutional right to 
self-governance that legitimizes the court's inquiry into the nature of fundamental 
personal rights. He locates this right in the ninth amendment, which affords protec-
tion to unlisted liberties. The clearest statement of the American commitment to self-
governance, he argues, is found in Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 
and in the philosophy of Jeffersonian individualism. Drawing on the writing of Jeffer-
son and Lincoln, Professor Nichol asserts that our society has committed itself to 
"the progressive unfolding of individual sovereignty." 
Critics of the United States Supreme Court's decisions that give constitutional 
protection to personal privacy interests have never suffered from a lack of ammuni-
tion. The Court has failed to locate unambiguously the textual source of rights identi-
fied in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade. Nor has it been able to 
construct a general theory that might explain why some rights have been found fun-
damental while others have not. The result has been uncertainty about future deci-
sions, and protests that the Court's actions in this area are an illegitimate usurpation 
of power. Professor Nichol argues that only by recognizing and explicitly incorporat-
ing our societal dedication to self-governance into constitutional discourse can a 
principled jurisprudence that mediates between personal autonomy and state inter-
ests be constructed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The privacy, or substantive due process, cases have posed difficul-
ties of profound dimension for American constitutionalists. 2 Easily the 
• Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law, College of William & Mary, and Director, 
Institute of Bill of Rights Law. The author wishes to thank the several friends and colleagnes who 
have offered helpful comments on various drafts of this Article. Toni Massaro, Chris Slobogin, 
Glenn George, and Tom Collins helped make the thoughts more presentable. Kent Greenawalt, 
Michael Perry, Erwin Chemerinsky, Kermit Hall, and Bill Marshall provided helpful substantive 
criticism. 
I. W.H. AUDEN, FOREWORDS & AFTERWORDS 9 (1973). 
2. The privacy cases have engendered a massive literature. See, e.g., the authorities 
cited in Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 83, 99-100 
(1980). 
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most controversial coinage of the modern United States Supreme 
Court, the civil privacy doctrine3 has touched upon matters fit for the 
novelist's pen: family, marriage, sex, morality, pornography, and abor-
tion, to name but a few. Judicial policy making in such areas no doubt 
rankles. Not surprisingly, major movements, encouraged by preach-
ers,4 journalists, 5 political parties,6 a president, 7 and now the United 
States Department of Justice, 8 have been spawned to overthrow one or 
more components of the doctrine. 
Moreover, the methodology employed by our highest tribunal to 
develop the privacy right has not ameliorated opposition. Without elu-
cidation, various interests have been decreed either fundamental or not 
pursuant to a jurisprudential scheme which has not yet been broadcast 
beyond the walls of the Justices' conference room. The Court has been 
unable to conclude whether privacy analysis is based on textual, 9 con-
sensus, 10 traditional, 11 or autonomy interests. 12 No expressed theory 
offers even an approximate explanation of the various decisions, and 
the Court has apparently given up the attempt. 13 
The reason for all the difficulty, and perhaps for at least some of 
the controversy, 14 is easy to ascertain. The right of marital privacy pro-
3. I mean here to distinguish the Supreme Court's "privacy" cases from a body of 
decisions perhaps more deserving of the name-the search and seizure cases interpreting the 
fourth amendment. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
4. The most prominent of clerics involved in a massive and heart-felt anti-abortion 
movement is Rev. Jerry Falwell. See generally, R. LIEBMAN & R. WuTIINOW, THE NEW CHRISTIAN 
RIGHT: MOBILIZATION AND LEGITIMATION 1-39, 188-207 (1983). 
5. See, e.g., G. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT: WHAT GOVERNMENT DoES 84-5 
(1983). 
6. The 1984 Republican Party platform included an anti-abortion plank. See, Wash-
ington Post, Aug. 22, 1984, at All, col. 6. 
7. President Reagan has caUed for a constitutional amendment overturning the abor-
tion decisions. See R. REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CoNSCIENCE OF THE NATION (1984); N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 31, 1985, at Al6, col. l. 
8. The Justice Department has recently asked the United States Supreme Court to 
overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1985), atrd, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). 
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (theory that privacy rights are 
found in the "penumbra" of the first amendment). 
10. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
II. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (marital privacy "older" than the Constitution). 
12. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion .... " (emphasis in original)). 
13. See Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 ("[The} 
right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment concept of personal liberty 
... or ... in the Ninth Amendment reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encom-
pass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy ... "). 
14. Of course the aversion to the substantive rule in Roe v. Wade would likely be pro-
nounced even if a constitutional amendment explicitly granted a woman the right to terminate her 
pregnancy. 
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tected in Griswold v. Connecticut, 15 the freedom to terminate a preg-
nancy without interference by the state upheld in Roe v. Wade, 16 and 
the interests in familial association recognized in Moore v.-Cfty of Kast 
Cleveland, 17 to mention only the cornerstones of the privacy doctrine, 
are not derived from the text of the Constitution. Nor can it be said 
with candor that they are implicit in the various provisions' demands. 18 
Rather, the privacy cases have assumed that certain interests are so vital 
to our scheme of individual liberty that they merit constitutional status 
even if not explicitly listed in the text. The notion that rights which are 
"fundamental,"19 "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"20 or 
"whathaveyou"21 are judicially cognizable assumes that constitutional 
liberties may be broader, more expansive, and more vibrant than the 
particulars of the Bill of Rights. 
That premise is a troubling one. If one accepts the claim that in a 
representative democracy important policy decisions are to be made by 
elected representatives, extensive judicial authority is disconcerting 
from the outset. But some exercises of constitutional review present 
greater difficulty than others. On rare occasions, a ruling is based on the 
clear and unambiguous dictates of the text, 22 thus minimizing friction 
with democratic theory. The Justices can reasonably claim to be merely 
enforcing long standing mutual promises made by the nation as a 
whole, not the judiciary. Judicial attempts to venture past the strictures 
of the text, however, seem to offer no such solace. Fundamental rights 
"discovered" by unelected judges prevail over conflicting interests as-
serted by more representative institutions. Thus, tensions with the 
premises of representative government arise when a federal court looks 
beyond the text, as is done in the Griswold line of cases, to rule that a 
community is powerless to regulate various aspects of human behavior. 
15. '381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
16. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
17. 431 u.s. 494 (1977). 
18. Justice Douglas' penumbra theory made this claim in Griswold. He made little effort 
to explore, however, the connection between marital privacy and the specific textual provisions on 
which he relied. Instead he turned to the importance and tradition of the right. Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 486. 
19. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
20. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
21. The phrase is Alexander Bickel's. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: 
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 55 (1962). 
22. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (statute excluding blacks 
from jury eligibility on its face unconstitutional). 
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Comparisons to an earlier era when an activist judiciary sought to 
thwart the initiatives of the New Deal seem unavoidable. 23 
The almost unprecedented criticism which the privacy cases have 
engendered has claimed, in short, that such judicial actions are illegiti-
mate. 24 It has become commonplace to characterize the privacy deci-
sions as usurpations oflegislativc power, unsupported by either textual 
mandate or national judgment. The business of the judiciary, it is ar-
gued, is interpreting the Constitution, not formulating broad social pol-
icy. Since the privacy cases do not draw on the text, they are, at bottom, 
rooted in mere preference, not law. Critics claim that assertions that 
various interests are fundamental are hopelessly circular, reflecting only 
the generally liberal philosophies of the judges who pronounce them. 25 
The judicial protection of unlisted autonomy interests is said to be ille-
gitimate because it carries no constitutional pedigree. And a court 
which reaches beyond the dictates of the Constitution reaches beyond 
its power. 
Still, fear of judicial power presents only part of the privacy pic-
ture. The bulk of the interests protected in the cases seem somehow to 
belong to us as individuals. Almost intuitively, Americans feel that the 
intricacies of their sexual experiences, the particulars of their chosen 
lifestyles, and the aspects of their private lives generally, are none of the 
government's business. The idea that the state should not intrude into 
the intimate decisions of life is a vague yet persistent component of our 
societal ethos. It is not surprising then that as respected a figure as Jus-
tice Brandeis would refer to a right "to be let alone" in the "develop-
ment of the emotions,"26 "sensations" and "beliefs;"27 or that the 
Supreme Court, even in the 1950's, would declare in Kent v. Dulles28 
that "outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left 
to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he 
pleases."29 Neither Griswold nor its progeny go that far. The privacy 
cases primarily provide a refuge from intrusive state regulation for cer-
23. I refer here to the Lochner era and the confrontation between the Supreme Court and 
the New Deal. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 
238 (1936). 
24. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 300-302 (1977); J. ELY, DEMoc-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEoRY OF JUDICIAL REviEW 43-73 (1980); Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 51 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 396 {1981); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 
(1976). 
25. J. ELY, supra note 24, at 43-70. 
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
27. ld. 
28. 357 u.s. 116 (1958). 
29. Jd. at 126. See also, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3250 (1984) 
("ability independently to define one's identity" is "central to any concept of liberty ... "). 
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tain marital, procreative, and familial interests. 30 Nevertheless, appar-
ently drawing upon an American ethos of personalliberty,31 privacy 
analysis assumes that some infringements of personal autonomy are be-
yond the power of the state even though they are not proscribed by the 
particulars of the Constitution. 
This Article addresses the validity of the substantive due process 
cases' implicit premise-that certain core liberty interests, though not 
expressly protected by the Bill of Rights, are constitutional in nature. 
To my mind, Justice Brandeis' often quoted dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States32 and Justice Douglas' opinion in Kent v. Dulles touch 
upon essential aspects of the American vision of constitutional liberty. 
Decisions such as Griswold, which attempt to safeguard the ability of 
individuals to develop and act on their own conceptions of how life 
should be lived, recognize and draw on that vision. My claim is that 
there is, among the unenumerated "rights"33 acknowledged by the 
ninth amendment, a liberty interest of broader scope than the isolated34 
provisions of the Bill of Rights-which I shall describe as a right of 
"self-governance."35 Defined here as the ability to formulate, shape, 
and act upon the core aspects of one's sense of identity, character, and 
personality, the right to self-governance is rooted in an American dedi-
cation to personal autonomy in moral decision-making. If such a com-
mitment can be demonstrated, judicial efforts to shield autonomy inter-
ests should be considered within the heart of our constitutional 
heritage, implementing rather than thwarting our vision of democracy. 
The Griswold cases' implicit claim that constitutionally protected lib-
erty demands special solicitude for certain personal decisions, especially 
concerning what is, or is not the good life, is correct. 
The tools used here to support the claim for a constitutional inter-
est in self-governance are at least marginally non-traditional. 36 This 
30. The privacy cases form the core of the Supreme Court's substantive due process 
efforts. The Court has recognized a handful of other autonomy interests outside the classic privacy 
sphere. See, e.g., Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3244 (freedom of association); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307 (1982) (limited right to treatment in state mental facility). The privacy cases have pro-
tected procreative decisions. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 494 (right to choose family living ar-
rangement); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113 (right to abortion); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438 (contra-
ceptive use by unmarried persons); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (freedom from 
sterilization); and family-related interests and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1925) (right to 
choose parochial education curriculum). 
31. Since the Supreme court has not tied its privacy determinations to any textual provi-
sion, the decisions must be based upon some concept of fundamental liberties. 
32. 227 u.s. 438, 478 (1936). 
33. See infra section IV.A. for the discussion of my use of the term "rights." 
34. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
35. See infra text aecompanying notes 231-72 for a definition and diseussion of self-
governance in Section IV. 
36. But see the arguments for judicial power set forth in M. PERRY, THE CoNSTITUTION, 
THE CoURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Piss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. I 
1310 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Article argues that our constitutive tradition, the efforts we have made 
to define ourselves as a society, supports the recognition of a constitu-
tional autonomy interest. Drawing primarily on the speeches and writ-
ings of two of the United States' principal political architects, Thomas 
Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, I will attempt to show that we have 
committed ourselves-and at the time of the Civil War re-dedicated 
ourselves-to a particular sort of relationship between the citizen and 
the state. Our constitutional ethos37 assumes not only the intrinsic 
value of personal choice, but is premised upon a sense of moral equality 
and independence reflecting a belief that human beings are capable of 
setting the course for their own lives. 
To justify the recognition of an interest in self-governance, this dis-
cussion centers less on the merits of particular privacy cases than on the 
validity of judicial protection of non-textual autonomy interests. The 
effort is, in short, to claim legitimacy for the enterprise. Contrary to the 
heated arguments of the critics of substantive privacy review, judicial 
attempts to secure autonomy interests, when rooted in our societal 
commitment to self-governance, invigorate the open-ended provisions 
of the constitutional charter in a manner which fosters the underlying 
principles of our republic. 
My claims for the constitutionalization of a right to self-govern-
ance are necessarily multi-faceted. At the least, the provision defeats the 
strict textualist's claim that only those rights explicitly listed in the Con-
stitution are retained by the people. The legislative history of the ninth 
amendment suggests as well that the framers believed that even broader 
conceptions of retained liberties were not meant to be foreclosed by the 
adoption of the specifics of the first eight amendments. Part III presents 
an argument that constitutional analysis can be appropriately in-
structed by the exploration of out political tradition. In order to iden-
tify the admittedly expansive view of personal autonomy reflected in a 
right to self-governance, this Article turns primarily to the works of 
Jefferson and Lincoln. From their theories of the relationship between 
the individual and the state-theories to which they sought to commit 
the United States-a right of self-governance can be gleaned. Its exis-
tence can be supported even when one concedes that Jeffersonian indi-
vidualism was not the only founding premise of our republic, and that it 
must undoubtedly be adapted to a modern, highly-interdependent soci-
ety. Part IV preliminarily defines and measures the scope of the right. 
(1979); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law ill American Revolutionary 
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Richards, The Individual, The Family and The Constitution: 
A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. I (1980). 
37. The use of this term is suggested by Phillip Bobbitt's excellent book. SeeP. BoBBITT, 
CoNSTITUTIONAL FATE 94 (1982). 
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Finally, having outlined a framework of Jeffersonian liberty, Ire-
turn explicitly to the claim that the constitution should be interpreted to 
include a right of self-governance. American constitutional decision-
making is in major part a process of societal self-definition. Through its 
tensions, we choose and hone fundamental values, specifying the prin-
ciples for which we stand and inching toward the sort of country we 
wish to become. Thus, the process appropriately responds to the 
"founding, constitutive aspirations" 38 of our public tradition. It is here 
that the contributions of Jefferson and Lincoln play a significant role. 
II. THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND NON-TEXTUAL RIGHTS 
Gordon Wood has written perceptively about the pervasive am-
bivalence among the founders of our republic over the relationship be-
tween written and natural law. 39 That they enacted a Constitution em-
bodying explicit limitations on government power could be said to 
demonstrate the founders' adherence to Samuel Adams' belief that ex-
pressly written documents were the best security against the danger of 
an "indefinite dependence upon an indeterminate power."4° Further-
more, there was substantial demand for inclusion of a Bill of Rights 
both during and after the ratification process. More strongly than their 
successors, the colonists were schooled in the abuses of power. Explicit 
declarations of positive law were thought to be among tl1e stoutest tools 
which could be aimed at such usurpation. As Thomas Jefferson wrote 
to James Madison," ... a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to 
against every government on earth. . . . " 41 
Yet, the American vision of civil liberty had been premised-al-
most necessarily so-on contractarian theory.42 Putting laws on parch-
ment merely affirmed their existence, it did not create them. 43 A people 
so fresh from revolution could not easily concede that legal rights ex-
isted only if confirmed by positive enactment. Ambiguity about the na-
ture of law thus led many to seek explicit written charters, though they 
" ... were never willing to acknowledge that the 'obligation of the ruled 
to obey' depended 'solely upon, "Be it enacted, Etc."' " 44 
38. Perry, The Authority of Text, Traditions and Reasons: A Theory of "Constitutional 
Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 563 (1985). 
39. G. Wooo, THE CREATION OF TilE AMEiucAN REPusuc 1776-1787 at 291-94 (1969). 
40. Adams, House of Representatives of Massachusetts to the Speakers of other Houses 
of Representatives (Feb. 11, 1768) in 1 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 185 (H. Cushing ed. 1968). 
41. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) in THE PORTABLE 
JEFFERSON 430 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as JEFFERSON]. 
42. G. Wooo, supra note 39, at 259-305. 
43. ld. at 294. 
44. ld. at 295. 
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This same ambivalence is reflected in the Bill of Rights. Although 
the provisions of the first eight amendments were designed to provide 
specific reservoirs of individual freedom from federal intervention, the 
ninth amendment declares that the " ... enumeration of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple. " 45 The tenth amendment makes a distinct claim concerning gov-
ernment powers: those not delegated are " ... reserved to the states ... 
or to the people."46 On its face, therefore, the Bill of Rights nods to 
both positive law and at least some notion of natural or other non-
textual authority. 
Ambivalence over the force of natural law was not the only moti-
vation for the ninth amendment. A Bill of Rights was, of course, 
thought to be an essential bulwark against legislative abuse. In a more 
strategic vein, however, it also seemed likely that lingering opposition 
to the Constitution itself could be assuaged by a declaration ofliberties. 
Introducing the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives, Madi-
son reminded his colleagues that " ... it will be a desirable thing to 
extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community, any 
apprehension that there are those among his countrymen who wish to 
deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honora-
bly bled."47 Tactically, therefore, Madison was interested in producing 
a list of liberties which would be accepted universally, quickly, and 
without controversy. 
Writing to Randolph during the debates, Madison explained that 
it had been " ... absolutely necessary in order to effect anything, to 
abbreviate debate, and exclude every proposition of doubtful and un-
important nature. "48 Introducing his proposals, he claimed that his 
purpose had been to formulate only alterations "likely to meet the con-
currence required by the constitution."49 To that end, Madison coun-
selled his allies that items of a "controvertible nature ought not to be 
hazarded,"since "two or three contentious additions would even now 
prostrate the whole project."50 
The desire to propose a list of rights sufficiently uncontroversial so 
as to assure swift passage resulted in an obvious concern over what 
would be left out. Madison conceded on the floor of the Congress that 
worry over the negative implication arising from listing "particular ex-
45. U.S. CoNST. amend. IX. 
46. U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
47. THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1024 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as RIGHTS]. 
48. Letter from James Madison to John Randolph (Aug. 21, 1789) in 5 WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 417-18 (G. Hunted. 1904) [hereinafter cited as MADISON}. 
49. RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 1025. 
SO. Letter from James Madison to John Pendleton (June 21, 1789) in MADISON, supra 
note 48, at 405-06. 
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ceptions to the grant of power" was "one of the most plausible argu-
ments ... urged against the admission of a bill of rights .... " 51 His 
response, long before anticipated, was the inclusion of the ninth amend-
ment. The language of the provision was designed to lay to rest the 
claim that only those rights named in the first eight amendments are 
protected from government abrogation. The amendment, therefore, 
clearly means what it says. Whether or not it can be seen as a repository 
of independent federal rights, it surely reflects the framers' belief that 
fundamental liberties exist which are not set forth in the text. 52 
Constitutional theorists who insist that only those liberties clearly 
set forth in the text are subject to judicial enforcement thus have under-
standable difficulty with the ninth amendment. Their supposedly strict 
textual approach carries obvious appeal. Quite logically, it calls for the 
enforcement of expressed enumerations of positive rights, and those 
alone. 53 The source of judicial power appears clear as well-the lan-
guage of the text. No subjectivity or usurpation here. Because of the 
language of the ninth amendment, however, the tight interpretivist 
claim is plagued by self-contradiction. The language of the text is said 
to control, except when that language calls for the recognition of un-
listed rights. Moreover, the strict textualist is forced to embrace the 
negative implication arising from the adoption of the Bill of Rights 
which Madison went to such pains to avoid. 54 
The debates over the framing of the Bill of Rights also offer some 
guidance as to the types of interests which were not included. The most 
obvious omissions were those interests thought to be insubstantial. 
Congressman Sedgwick's arguments against the inclusion of a right to 
assembly demonstrate the point. Sedgwick-with some belated support 
from the Supreme Court55 -thought that the protection of freedom of 
speech rendered the right of assembly unnecessary. The protection of 
"minutiae," he argued, was "derogatory to the dignity of the House." 56 
Were the assurance of all rights to have been the goal of the Bill of 
Rights, "[The Committee] might have gone into a very lengthy enumer-
ation of rights; they might have declared that a man should have a right 
to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and 
go to bed when he thought proper .... " 57 The Congress, of course, 
51. /d. at 1031. 
52. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486, 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
53. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-10 (Black, J., dissenting); R. BERGER, supra note 
24. See also Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 431 n.83 (1985). 
54. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion of Judge Bork 
holding right to privacy does not protect homosexual conduct); Bork, supra note 24. 
55. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
56. RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 1090. 
57. /d. 
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accepted the right of assembly over Sedgwick's protest. It did so, how-
ever, under the belief that assembly constitutes a vital interest, not that 
trivial rights should be listed. 58 
Omitted rights could be deemed trivial, in the sense Sedgwick and 
Madison 5 9 used the term, in two distinct ways. A right-such as a right 
to wear a hat-<;ould be simply thought unimportant. In that case, if 
Congress were to pass a statute forbidding the wearing of hats in public, 
the ninth amendment would, one supposes, defeat an inference that the 
national government was empowered to so legislate. Just because the 
Bill of Rights chooses not to protect trivial interests does not mean, 
without more, that no trivial rights exist. 
More importantly, however, Sedgwick regarded the assembly right 
trivial because "it would never be called in question. " 60 What was the 
need to protect interests which would never be abrogated? In the event 
that future, unforeseeable civil liberties crises arose-as they undoubt-
edly would-the ninth amendment was designed in part to overcome 
any inference that claims to constitutional protection had been fore-
closed. Consider, for example, the ordinance struck down in Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland. 61 Might not the family interests abrogated 
there-the right of a grandmother to live with her grandson-be the 
sort which Sedgwick or Madison thought "would never be called into 
question?" The ninth amendment should at least stand as an impedi-
ment to a claim that such an interest cannot receive constitutional pro-
tection because it is not listed in the Bill of Rights. 
The ninth amendment was also proposed to meet a final concern of 
Madison and the other architects of the Bill of Rights. One of the 
weightiest arguments made against the adoption of any declaration of 
liberties was that the rights could not be described with sufficient 
breadth. Better to leave assumed rights unexpressed than to fix cribbed 
descriptions of them in the stone of positive law. Jefferson, writing to 
Madison before the Bill ofRightswas presented to the Congress, urged 
against scuttling the project over these difficulties. 62 
Madison chose to follow the advice of his mentor, coupled with the 
protections of the ninth amendment. In Congress, Madison argued that 
a Bill of Rights was a good idea "provided it can be framed as not to 
imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration .... I am 
58. /d. 
59. Madison explained to Randolph the need to exclude matters of an "unimportant 
nature." MADISON, supra note 48, at 417. 
60. RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 1090. 
61. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In Moore, an East Cleveland zoning ordinance employed a 
restrictive definition of allowable "single-family" dwellings. Mrs. Moore was convicted of violat-
ing the provision by living with her son and two grandsons. The Supreme Court invalidated the 
conviction employing substantive due process analysis. 
62. JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 430. 
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sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public 
definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be 
by an assumed power."63 Madison proved prescient on that very point. 
The broader "rights of conscience" became the narrower, if more 
pointed, establishment and free exercise clauses in the final draft of the 
Bill of Rights.64 Yet his inclusion of the ninth amendment stands as 
recognition that "public definition[s]" of essential liberties are almost 
inescapably narrow. Broader unenumerated liberties should not be 
"denied or disparaged" by the listing of their more precise 
counterparts. 
The ninth amendment, therefore, plays an essential role in analyz-
ing the propriety of the judicial protection of various non-textual liber-
ties. At bottom, the amendment defeats any claim that there are no 
non-textual constitutional rights~ Beyond that, the rationale for the 
amendment easily suggests that a negative inference is particularly in-
appropriate in cases in which the interference with liberty is of a sort 
unfamiliar to the framers. Since the drafters included the amendment 
primarily to remedy inescapable defects of lack of foresight and nar-
rowness of language, analogy to expressed guarantees as a source of 
decision-making in many modern, unforeseeable constitutional dis-
putes is strongly supported by the history of the "forgotten"65 
amendment. 
63. I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (1789). 
64. RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 1026-29. 
65. See B. PATIERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Redlich, Are There 
"Certain Rights .. . Retained By The People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787 (1962). See also Madison's 
declarations in THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961): 
The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the 
ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly 
and exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply words 
and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally 
denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen that however accurately the discrimina-
tion may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccu-
racy of the terms in which it is delivered. 
The specificity/generality argument made here can, of course, be seen to cut both ways. I 
claim that Madison turned to specific, widely accepted, and essentially non-controversial liberty 
guarantees so as to assure speedy ratification. He included the ninth amendment to alleviate con-
cern over what was left out and to remedy defects resulting from the narrowness and specificity of 
the language employed. It is also true that phrases like "freedom of speech" and "freedom of the 
press," because of their vagueness and breadth, work to create consensus during the ratification 
process which would likely not have existed concerning concrete disputes about expression. For 
example, Adams and Jefferson could more easily agree on the propriety of the first amendment 
than on the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Act. This disparity may suggest something 
about the way that the first amendment should be interpreted, however, though I am not sure 
exactly what that something would be. However, this observation does not change the fact that the 
ninth amendment was designed in no small part to address the implications of ratifying "half a 
loaf." 
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More important to the remainder of this Article, however, the 
ninth amendment presented a partial response to the Bill of Rights' 
choice of specificity over generality. Specificity helped to assure consen-
sus-obviously necessary if such an expedited package deal was to be 
successful. In this light, the Bill of Rights itself might reasonably be seen 
as a listing of prohibitions of government powers which, at the time, 
seemed particularly essential to the framers. Given their recent disputes 
with England, the list is an understandable one. But, as Madison recog-
nized, the list is dangerous for what it does not say, and for political 
theorists like Jefferson and Madison it could at best represent but "half 
a loaf." The amendment should defeat an inference that the listing of 
specific aspects of self-regulation-freedom of expression or worship, 
for example-implies that no more generalized right is protected. Since 
the ninth amendment was aimed at curing the absence of"requisite lati-
tude" in the various provisions of the text, it provides support for the 
recognition of a broader, more theoretical constitutional interest such 
as a right to self-governance. 
Ill. AN ETHOS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 
To acknowledge our ancestors means we are aware that we 
did not make ourselves .... The grace with which we 
embrace life, in spite of the pain, the sorrows, is always a 
measure of what has gone before. 66 
-ALICE WALKER 
It is one thing to show that there are unenumerated rights. It is 
quite another to discover what those rights might be. The judicial pro-
tection of "fundamental" personal liberties has been claimed justifiable 
primarily through four sorts of arguments. The first-tradition67 -
appeared in Griswold itself. Justice Douglas argued that the marital pri-
vacy rights abrogated by the Connecticut statute had been recognized 
even before the adoption of the Constitution. 68 Apart from Griswold, 
however, few of the privacy decisions can claim sustenance from any 
66. A. WALKER, REvOLUTIONARY PETUNIAS AND OTIIBR POEMS 1 (1971). 
67. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-60 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); J. ELY, supra note 24, at 60-63. 
68. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
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even moderately honest concept of tradition. 69 Consensus, 70 a second 
candidate, at least presents the possibility of vitality. 71 But as Dean Ely 
has persuasively shown, there is no existing American consensus to in-
struct decision-making in modem constitutional disputes; and even if 
there is such a consensus, the judiciary is particularly ill-suited to dis-
cover it. 72 
Moral philosophy, a third possibility, has proven a fertile field for 
autonomy theorists. 73 As a method of decision-making, it offers the 
comfort of articulated principle and the sense of satisfaction which 
comes from merging the demands of reason with those of the Constitu-
tion. But as is the case with any non-textual (or perhaps even textual) 
rights theory, the use of moral philosophy to measure constitutional 
power is subject to charges ofindeterminancy. 74 More importantly, it is 
flawed as a foundation for constitutional principle. There is, and should 
be, a gulf between philosophy and law, constitutional or otherwise. At a 
minimum, if constitutional · principle is to provide, to use Charles 
Black's phrase, decision according to law,75 it must find its genesis in 
societal commitment. If, for example, the next decade were to present a 
new Aristotle whose modem visions of the relationship between the in-
dividual and the state proved incapable of refutation, it is unclear why, 
for that reason alone, our constitutional order should have changed 
one whit. Moral philosophy may well hone and criticize constitutional 
principle, but without public ratification it cannot provide its 
foundation. 
69. Obviously Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113, cannot be supported on the basis of tradi-
tionally accepted government limits. Neither can Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 628 
(1977) (contraception rights of non-married minors); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438 (contraception 
rights of non-married persons); or Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of 
pornographic materials). 
70. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360-
69 (Marshall, J., concurring); Lupu, Untangling The Strands of The Fourteenth Amendment, 77 
MICH. L. REv. 981, 1040 (1979); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Stan-
dards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973). 
71. Depending on how one measures popular will-an insurmountable problem for the 
judiciary-consensus could be said to support the bulk of the privacy cases, even possibly the 
abortion rulings. It would, however, by definition afford little protection to unpopular rights. See 
Doe v. Commonwealth Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) 
(no substantive due process right to practice homosexual conduct). 
72. J. ELY, supra note 24, at 63-69. 
73. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); 
Michaelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659; Richards, 
Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 295 (1979); Richards, Moral Philosophy and the Search for 
Fundamental Values in Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319 (1981). 
74. See J. ELY, supra note 24, at 56-60; M. PERRY, supra note 36, at 91-97. 
75. See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981). But see, Richards, Interpreta-
tion and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 490, 533 (1985), "The rich common discourse between 
philosophy and law ... dcepen[s] both enterprises." 
1318 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
More successful arguments for a constitutional autonomy guaran-
tee have been based upon a fourth method of analysis, analogy and 
extrapolation from existing textual guarantees and structure of govern-
ment. 76 Constitutional decision-making based upon relation to explicit 
guarantees, again a technique suggested in Griswold, 77 is consistent 
with both the language of the open-ended provisions of our charter and 
the demand that limitations on government power be rooted in societal 
commitment rather than individual philosophical predilection. Yet, as 
is the case with Justice Douglas' penumbral theory, analogical analysis 
can focus its attention in an almost endless variety of directions. While 
one critic might find privacy rights through analysis of equal citizen-
ship, 78 another could derive freedom of contract from constitutional 
provisions protecting economic expectations, such as the contracts 
clause 79 and the takings clause. 80 "Penumbralizing" can reasonably 
provide little protection for modern autonomy interests unless the 
method accepts fairly loose linkage between explicit and penumbral 
rights. The link between Griswold's privacy right, for example, and the 
language of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments is an elusive 
one. If loose analogy is allowed, however, the theory collapses into the 
fundamental rights analysis it was designed to avoid. 
Discovery by analogy, if it employs no overarching theory of lib-
erty to direct its inquiry, also carries a hint of playing Hamlet without 
the Prince. Specific rights are advocated on the strength of their ties to 
other specific, but recognized, constitutional interests. Less likely to oc-
cur, however, is a search for a broader concept of individual freedom 
which may instruct a number of the specified textual guarantees. I hope 
to examine our constitutional commitment to autonomy in a more 
generalized, yet possibly more direct, fashion. Moving past the listed 
references, it may be possible to explore constitutional liberty itself, 
taking Thoreau's advice to "gird up [our] loins once more, and continue 
[our] pilgrimage to its fountainhead." 81 
Even ifl am correct, however, that these various rights theories fall 
short of providing adequate defenses of the privacy cases on their own 
76. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 75, at 50; C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP 
IN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. 
REv. 3 (1970); Laycock, Book Review, 59 TEx. L. REv. 343 (1981). 
77. 381 U.S. at 481-86. Justice Douglas' penumbral theory, pursuant to which he derived 
the right of marital privacy protected in Griswold, is similar to analogic interpretations. 
78. See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 663 (1980). 
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 10, cl. I, provides in pertinent part, "No State shall ... pass any 
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in pertinent part, "[No) private property (shall] be 
taken for public use, without just compensation." 
81. H.D. THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 135 (C. 
Bode ed. 1947). 
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terms, my goal is to supplement and draw upon their claims rather than 
to replace them. My arguments for constitutional recognition of a right 
of self-governance tum, at least in part, to a core, consensus commit-
ment of our political tradition. Like moral theorists, I seek to examine 
the philosophy of liberty which is reflected in our constitutional order. 
An analogist could point out that a right of self-governance, as I de-
scribe it below, has roots in the listed guarantees of equal protection, 
free expression, religious liberty, and freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Further, I hope to provide additional ammuni-
tion for such traditional rights claims. Ifl am able to identify a commit-
ment to personal autonomy which undergirds our democratic founda-
tions, that commitment may provide a crucial link to various 
arguments for the protection of substantive interests based upon politi-
cal or ethical philosophy. Any examination of our historical dedication 
to self-determination may also assist in the discovery of appropriate 
analogues to the enumerated provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Still, I primarily choose a different tack. My arguments supporting 
a constitutional interest in self-governance are rooted in what I see as 
an American dedication to the progressive unfolding of individual sov-
ereignty. The centerpiece of my position is a claim of societal commit-
ment. Unlike rights theories based upon moral or political philosophy, 
I argue not only that the protection of various autonomy interests is 
justified because it is wise or laudable, but, more fundamentally, be-
cause we have chosen that course as a nation. At first glance, of course, 
it seems odd to search for constitutional interests through some process 
of societal self-exploration. Yet constitutional inquiry inevitably impli-
cates both our relationship to our national past and our identity as 
Americans. 82 I shall argue as well that constitutional decision-making 
is a major tool by which we constitute ourselves as a society-based 
upon both past and present promises to each other and to ourselves. 
Professor Tribe is surely correct that " ... in making [constitutional] 
choices we reaffirm and create, select and shape, the values and truths 
we hold sacred. Such decisions determine much about how we define 
our society and specify much about what we stand for and what sort of 
country we wish to become."83 That being the case, it seems appropri-
ate that constitutional interests should be traceable not only through 
explicit textual provisions and direct analogies to those provisions, 84 
82. See Levinson, Book Review, 59 TEX. L. REv. 395, 419 (1981). 
83. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency, 98 HARv. L. 
REv. 592, 595 (1985). 
84. See Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 37 
(1970). 
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but also, as Charles Black has written, through "matter[s] of record as 
to national judgment."85 
I will attempt to identify a "national judgment," or dedication, to 
the promotion of individual liberty which entails a grounding commit-
ment to the concept of self-governance. Based primarily upon the writ-
ings of Jefferson and Lincoln, my arguments acknowledge that the rec-
ognition of specific rights plays an important role in determining the 
specific nature of our culture. 86 If it can be shown that we have commit-
ted ourselves as a people to a view of individual self-determination 
which limits the power of government to impose its vision of the good 
life upon its citizenry, then the case for judicial enforcement of that 
commitment is strong. 
Such arguments are, no doubt, a step outside the main channels of 
modern constitutional scholarship, and even perhaps modern intellec-
tual thought. They assume, for example, that the response to the ques-
tion "[i]s that what America stands for?" 87 should be taken seriously. 
Instead of offering the usual academic stance-which takes as its pri-
mary mission the discovery and exaggeration of analytical flaws, and 
thereby generally concludes that nothing of substance about values or 
societal commitment can be said88 -my aim is to offer at least some 
affirmative content for the often vacuous referent, American ideology. 
Finally, I assume here that we can learn from what has gone before. We 
are neither the first, nor, one hopes, the last generation to struggle with 
the dilemmas contained in the phrase "ordered liberty."89 I argue that 
some principal actors in our constitutional history~ven if not the 
semi-divine characters portrayed in our civics classes-have contrib-
uted to our perceptions of human liberty in profound ways. 
It remains to be asked, of course, even if constitutional analysis 
can appropriately take cognizance of matters of "national judgment," 
why turn to Jefferson and Lincoln? Among American political figures, 
Jefferson and Lincoln are, no doubt, powerful spokesmen of our com-
mon ideals. A trip to the Washington Mall alone gives testimony to that 
85. See C. BLACK, supra note 75, at 63. 
86. See Tushnet, An Essay On Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1365 (1984). 
87. The question is widely attributed to Chief Justice Warren. See Bartlett, Earl War-
ren-A Tribute, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 17 n.8 (1970); Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARV. L. REv. 
1, 2 (1969); Traynor, Chief Justice Warren's Fair Question, 58 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1969). 
Professor Monaghan uses the question to deride aggressive constitutional theorists. See 
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 396 (1981). 
88. See, e.g., Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (and What Do They Do With Their 
Knowledge)? Comments On Schauer and Moore, 58 So. CAL. L. REv. 441 (1985); Levinson, Law as 
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982); Tushnet, supra note 84; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid 
Down: A Critique of /nterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781 (1983). 
89. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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much. Yet their roles in our democratic development are, if anything, 
more profound than their respective memorials suggest. 
Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of Independence, 
draftsman of the Virginia Bill Establishing Religious Freedom, mentor 
of James Madison who played key roles in the enactment of the Consti-
tution and Bill of Rights, spearhead of the democratic revolution of 
1800, and third President of the United States, can rightly be called the 
primary architect of our democracy.9° Carl Becker correctly claimed 
that " ... more than any other man, we think of Jefferson as having 
formulated the fundamental principles of our American democracy, of 
what we now like to call the American way of life. "91 Lincoln himself 
asserted that the "principles ofJefferson are the definitions and axioms 
of a free society."92 Jefferson's cause of self-government was, as Frank-
lin Roosevelt declared over four decades ago, "a cause to which we [as a 
. ] . d ,93 nation ... are committe .... 
Even Jefferson's most strident modern critic, Leonard Levy, char-
acterizes him as "the foremost spokesman of the [founding] genera-
tion"94 and the "central figure in the American libertarian tradition."95 
In his admittedly unbalanced attack on Jefferson's civil liberties record, 
Levy admits that Jefferson's principles "sprang from the deepest aspira-
tions of the people. " 96 His efforts, to quote Levy, constituted "a classic 
90. See generally C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922); D. BOORSTIN, 
THE LoST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1948); H.S. CoMMANGER, JEFFERSON, NATIONALISM, AND 
THE ENLIGHtENMENT (1975); J. Dos PASSOS, THE MEN WHO MADE THE NATION (1957); JEFFERSON, 
supra note 40; T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STAlE OF VIRGINIA, (W. Peden ed. 1955); L. LEVY, 
JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963); D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS 
OF MAN (1951); S. PADOVER, A JEFFERSON PROFILE (1956); C. PATlERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1953); M. PE1ERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN 
MIND (1960); N. SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY (1951); G. WILLS, INVENTING 
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978). 
Some have argued that Alexander Hamilton actually contributed more to the development 
of our government structure and sense of nationalism than did Jefferson. See, e.g., G. GROB & G. 
BtLLIAS, l INtERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY: PATtERNS AND PERSPECTIVES 189-224 (4th ed. 
1982). My argument for the constitutionalization of a Jeffersonian view of individual autonomy 
does not assume that Jefferson was either the best person among the founding generation or its 
unequivocal leader. Rather, I think that Jefferson has helped form the American vision of personal 
liberty and the appropriate relation between the individual and the state. Hamilton offers no ri-
valry on such issues. 
91. Becker, What Is Still Living in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?, re-
printed in M. PElERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A PROFILE 42 (1967). 
92. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to H.L. Pierce and others (Apr. 6, 1859) in ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 489 (R. Basler ed. 1946) (hereinafter cited as LINCOLN). 
93. Franklin Roosevelt, Address at the Dedication of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
(Apr. 13, 1943) in JEFFERSON READER 246 (F. Rosenberger ed. 1953). 
94. See L. LEVY, supra note 90, at xi. 
95. !d. at xii. 
96. ld. at l. Leonard Levy has strongly criticized Jefferson's public performanee on civil 
liberties issues. He points, most particularly, to actions against the Burr conspiracy and in support 
of scattered libel suits. See id. at 42-92. Given the tensions presented throughout Jefferson's public 
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expression of the American creed of intellectual as well as religious 
liberty .... " 97 
Lincoln, on the other hand, personifies not only our national com-
mitment to save the Union, but to save it, and democratic government, 
"dedicated"98 to the principles of the Declaration of Independence. 99 
Lincoln's "memorable vision of what this country was truly about ... 
has prevailed and become part of our ordinary political conscious-
ness."100 Even if a bit ethnocentric, there is much truth in George 
Will's claim that Lincoln was the "greatest statesman in the history of 
democracy." 101 Perhaps more important for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, Will refers to the Lincoln-Douglas debates as an introduction to the 
"central event of our democracy." 102 And again, even Lincoln's harsh-
est critics have admitted-vital to my claims here--that his presidency 
was directed toward the recontracting of American society on the basis 
of Jeffersonian maxims of democracy. 103 
By turning to Jefferson and Lincoln as sources of the American 
political tradition, it is not necessary to embrace the saintly portraits of 
their lives reflected in high school history books. Whether or not they 
career, the record cannot be seen as a devastating one. The potential instability of the early govern-
ment, the actions of the Federalists threatening the development of democracy in the United 
States, and Burr's unpredictability as well as possible dangerousness, at least, work to make Jeffer-
son's behavior understandable. Whether or not Levy's allegations are accurate, they do not under-
cut the arguments for constitutionalizing Jeffersonian liberty theories here. 
Levy would not necessarily disagree. He concludes that "in the long run [Jefferson's] pen 
was mightier than his practice, for his rhetoric helped to create an American creed." /d. at 19. That 
his "libertarianism was considerably less than perfect or that his practice flagged behind his faith 
does not one whit diminish the achievements by which he is best remembered and should be. That 
he did not always adhere to his libertarian principles does not erode their enduring rightness." /d. 
at 175-76. Jefferson, Levy continues, "survives ... because a free people still cherishes the spirit of 
liberty and its foremost exponent among the founders of the Republic." /d. at 2. My claim is that 
Jefferson is a primary spokesman of American constitutional ideals and that his formulations of 
freedom represent a fundamental part of our constitutive ethos because we have embraced them as 
a people. If Levy is right about a variety of Jefferson's acts, then it is true that Jefferson's pen has 
been literally more powerful than his conduct. Like Woodrow Wilson, I think that the "immortal-
ity of Jefferson does not lie in any one of his achievements but in his attitude toward mankind." 
See infra note 112. His pen has shaped our ideals as a nation, and, as I argue in the final section of 
this Article, American constitutional law is inextricably bound to those ideals. See also infra note 
126. 
97. L. LEVY, supra note 90, at 6. 
98. See The Gettysburg Address, in LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 734. See generally R. 
HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1948); THE 
LINCOLN READER (P. Angle ed. 1947); J. NICOLAY, ABRAHAM LINCOLN (1906); S. OATES, WITH 
MALICE TOWARD NONE (1977); C. SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE PRAIRIE YEARS; THE WAR 
YEARS (1939); K.C. WHEARE, LINCOLN (1948). 
99. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 734. 
100. See infra text accompanying notes 136-55. 
101. Will, What to Read? Start With Genesis, Washington Post June 28, 1984, at 15, § I, 
col. I. 
102. /d. 
103. See G. WILLS, supra note 90. 
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were extraordinary persons, which they clearly were, Jefferson and Lin-
coln were central actors in the two primary constitutive phases of our 
history: the founding ofthe republic104 and the final forging of the na-
tion through the Civil War. When a nation is "created," or rededicated, 
attention necessarily turns to the distinguishing characteristics of the 
ensuing entity. It is in this role of self-exploration, 105 dedication, 106 
and aspiration 107 that Jefferson and Lincoln have so significantly 
helped form our vision of ourselves as a nation. For this reason alone it 
is unsurprising that prominent historians would call Jefferson and Lin-
coln "the central figure[s] in the history of American democracy." 108 
Even though they were products of their respective eras, hardly 
free from the shortcomings and prejudices of their times, 109 and even if 
on occasion their practices fell somewhat sort of their declarations, 110 
Jefferson and Lincoln remain primary spokesman of American political 
ideology. 111 Their public declarations sought to explore and direct the 
underlying premises of our democratic institutions, helping to build our 
political tradition in haunting phrases. Woodrow Wilson thus rightly 
claimed that the "immortality of Jefferson does not lie in any one of his 
achievements but in his attitude towards mankind." 112 It is possible 
that in honoring Jefferson and Lincoln the American people reflect 
their own ideals and aspirations more than history. But it is in part, I 
will argue, the ideals and aspirations of the nation which constitutional 
law seeks to tap. The felt, symbolic hold which both they and their vi-
sions of political life exercise over the American people are more impor-
tant than their specific actions. For me, Jefferson and Lincoln are prin-
104. T. PAINE, CoMMON SENSE, reprinted in THE SELECTED WORK OF TOM PAINE 18 (H. 
Fast ed. 1945). 
105. "On the question of liberty, as a principle, we are not what we have been ... The 
fourth of July has not quite dwindled away; it is still a great day-for burning fire-crackers!!f' 
(emphasis in original). Letter from Abraham Lincoln to George Robertson (Aug. 15, 1855) in 2 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 318 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (hereinafter cited as 2 
LINCOLN WORKS]. 
106. The Gettysburg Address, in LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 734 ("conceived in liberty 
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal"). 
107. "[The Declaration oflndependence is] meant to set up a standard maxim for a free 
society, which could be familiar to all, and revered by all, constantly looked to, constantly labored 
for .... " Lincoln, speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857) in LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 361. 
108. L. LEVY, supra note 90, at I. 
109. Jefferson held slaves and Lincoln called for the return of blacks to Africa to solve the 
slavery issue. SeeS. OATES, supra note 90, at 126. See also infra note 162. 
110. Here, particularly, Jefferson has been the subject of attack. See L. LEVY, supra note 
90. See also supra note 96; infra text accompanying notes 126-27. 
Ill. See C. BECKER, supra note 90, at 17; Becker, What Is Still Living in the Political 
Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, 87 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 201-10 
(1944); L. LEVY, supra note 90, at 1-24. 
112. D. BooRSTIN, supra note 90, at ix. See also R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 98, at 92 
("The Lincoln legend has come to have a hold on the American imagination that defies compari-
son with anything else in political mythology"). · 
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cipal architects of our constitutive tradition. Even if they are not, their 
efforts at least represent major contributions to our societal attempts at 
self-definition. 
A. The Jeffersonian Concept of Individual Liberty 
[T]he Welshman got it planted where it will trouble us for a 
thousand years. Each age will have to reconsider it. 113 
-ROBERT FROST 
Thomas Jefferson proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence 
that "all men are created equal" and "endowed by their Creators with 
Certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness."114 By these words, the Second Continental Con-
gress sought not only to sever its relationship with Great Britain, but to 
dedicate the freed colonies to a philosophy of government. As Lincoln 
would write eighty years later, Jefferson " ... in the concrete pressure of 
a struggle for national independence ... introduced into a merely revo-
lutionary document, an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all 
times." 115 
Of course the sexist terminology, the grim realities of an acknowl-
edged slavery, the colonial embrace of aristocracy, and the vagueness of 
"liberty" and the "pursuit of happiness' complicate the Declaration's 
status as "an abstract truth" for all times. Jefferson's concept of liberty 
was no doubt an imperfect one, at least for the interdependent society 
which is two centuries its successor. Its application has not only been 
113. R. FROST, The Black Cottage, reprinted in A TRIBUTE TO mE SouRCE 20 (H. Carruth 
ed. 1979). 
114. READINGS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 67 (G. Stourgh ed. 1959). See also G. WILLS, 
supra note 90. Garry Wills' Inventing America has received much attention for its attempt to dis-
lodge the Declaration of Independence from its previously accepted roots in Lockean philosophy. 
See, e.g., C. BECKER, supra note 90 (arguing that the Declaration is based in the writings of John 
Locke). Perhaps taking advantage of the fact that Jefferson's early library was destroyed by fire, 
making proof of the claim impossible, Wills argues that Jefferson drew not on Locke but on the 
Scottish moral sense theorists Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Thomas Reid in formulating 
the document. 
The arguments presented here are unaffected by Wills' position. First, the Jeffersonian por-
trait of individual liberty I examine is drawn from the entire body of Jefferson's thought, not only, 
or even primarily, from the Declaration. Second, Wills' efforts seemed designed to overcome the 
use of a Lockean philosophical overlay to translate either the Declaration of Independence or 
Jeffersonian thought. His work thus contradicts historians such as Carl Becker and Daniel Boor-
stin. See supra note 90. In American constitutional theory, Wills' position is at odds with writers 
like David A.J. Richards who seek to measure constitutional principle, in part, through a Lockean 
lens. See, Richards, supra note 75. My argnments, however, rely on Jefferson and Lincoln, through 
their own language. Jefferson is not used as a tool to get to Locke, or as Wills would use him, to get 
to Hutcheson. 
115. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 489. 
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incomplete in both his time and thereafter, but Jefferson's maxims have 
been most successfully employed to justify economic interests which he 
would have likely rejected. Yet Jefferson's analysis of "liberty" points 
to the core of the relationship between citizen and the state in ways 
which remain compelling. 
For Jefferson, the "right of personal freedom," like the rights of 
thinking or publishing, could not be "surrendered" to the govern-
ment.116 His first post-Declaration attempts to explore the boundaries 
of the concept occured in tlle concrete arena of the Virginia legislature's 
pitched battles over the disestablishment of tlle Anglican Church. The 
Bill for Establislling Religious Freedom, authored by Jefferson within a 
year of the Declaration, 117 stated tllat "the opinions of men are not tlle 
object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction . . . it is time 
enough ... to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against 
peace and good order."118 Four years later when he was removed a bit 
from the fray, he generalized this concept in his widely regarded Notes 
on tlle State of Virginia. 119 Presaging John Stuart Mill by three 
quarters of a century, Jefferson wrote that "the legitimate powers of 
government extend to sucll acts only as are injurious to others." 120 
Upon assuming the Presidency, Jefferson offered his closest ap-
proximation to a treatise on good government. ln his first inaugural 
address he listed the demand for a "wise and frugal government, which 
shall restrain men from injuring one another, whicll sllallleave them 
otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improve-
ment" as a touchstone "of our political faith." 121 By the end of his life 
he had altered the formulation only slightly, writing that "no man has a 
natural right to commit aggression on the equal rights of another; and 
this is all from which the laws ought to restrain him." 122 Political lib-
erty for Jefferson amounted primarily to safeguarding individuals from 
transgressions by their neighbors, leaving them otherwise unllampered 
in tlleir efforts at self-development. 
116. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789) in RIGHTS, 
supra note 47, at 998-1000. 
117. See L. LEVY, supra note 90, at 3-8; N. SCHACHNER, supra note 90, at 156-162. 
118. Jefferson, A Bill Establishing Religious Freedom (June 1779) in JEFFERSON, supra note 
41, at 252-53. 
119. See J.S. MtLL, ON LIBERTY 60 (1948) (" ... the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
member is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others." 
120. JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 223. 
121. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) in JEFFERSON, supra note 
41, at 294. 
122. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Gilmer (June 7, 1816) in C. PATIERSON, 
supra note 90, at 59. 
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Jefferson's laissez-faire philosophy reflected an interesting set of 
underlying premises. Paramount among these was his belief that the 
proper ends of government did not include the attainment of the good 
society. Even if America could be counted on to produce a natural aris-
tocracy, 123 its rulers should not be charged with defining the ends of 
society. Only the Creator was qualified, in Daniel Boorstin's words, "to 
make the blueprint for community."124 A people develop, in short, by 
being unleashed from subservience to kings, priests, and nobles. Gov-
ernment attempts to define the good or moral life are not only intrusive 
and presumptuous, they are, at bottom, bad policy. "The evils flowing 
from the duperies of the people, are less injurious than those from the 
egoism of their agents." 125 
Proscribing non-injurious acts in order to foster a government-
sponsored vision of the moral life also violated Jefferson's commit-
ment-nascent though it was126 -to equality. In no small part, Jeffer-
son thought that coercion denigrated the moral instinct "nature hath 
123. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 533-39. ("For I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The 
grounds of this are virtue and talents.") 
124. See D. BooRSTIN, supra note 90, at 191. 
125. D. BooRSTIN, supra note 90, at 191. 
126. Speaking of Jefferson's commitment to equality can reasonably disturb. See L. HIG-
GINB01HAM, IN THE MATIER OF CoLOR (1978). Jefferson wrote that blacks are "inferior to whites in 
the endowments both of body and of mind," and that "women should be neither seen nor heard in 
society's deeision-making councils." /d. at 10, 41. He owned slaves as well. It is, of course, difficult 
to convey the horror of this chapter of American life. The narrow vision of equality under which 
the United States has developed is a devastating and undeniable aspeet of our history. All prog-
ress, however, assumes original defect, and Jefferson was committed to the unfolding development 
of equality. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 545. Jefferson, unlike many southerners of his day, at least appeared to recognize the 
injustice of slavery 
The public mind would not yet bear [emancipation], nor will it bear it even at this day. 
Yet the day is not distant when it must bear and adopt [emancipation], or worse will 
follow. Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate, than that these people are 
to be free .... If ... it is left to force itself on, human nature must shudder at the prospect 
held up. 
N. ScHAcHNER, supra note 90, at 154. And, of course, in his Notes on the State of Virginia he wrote 
"Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep 
forever." T. JEFFERSON, supra note 90, at 156. Jefferson drafted a Virginia bill for emancipation 
early in his career and attempted to stop the spread of slavery into the Northwest territories. The 
original Declaration also included a diatribe on the slave trade. SeeR. HoFSTADTER, supra note 98, 
at 21. 
The central focus of my claims for the constitutionalization of self-governance, however, is 
the Jeffersonian vision of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The argnments do not 
tum on his personal practices or on his moral worth. Jefferson had a tragic concept-as did the 
bulk of his contemporaries-of the classes of persons who should be considered competent mem-
bers of the political community. Two centuries later we have done much to correct that. What I 
examine here is the relationship between the state and its political community. I argue that the 
American vision of that relation assumes an ability to self-govern. 
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planted in our breasts."127 To his mind, incidental differences in mind 
and body were dwarfed by an all important equality in the governing 
faculty of human beings. 128 His plowman-professor analogy is instruc-
tive: "State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former 
will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not 
been led astray by artificial rules." 129 Democracy's future, for Jeffer-
son, was largely dependent on freeing common citizens from the moral 
dictates of an intellectual, religious, or hereditary elite. Yet Jefferson's 
aversion to "morals legislation" went deeper than his philosophical 
commitment to innate morality. 
Democracy was for Jefferson a theory of government which draws 
its sustenance from its regard for human beings and the value of their 
lives. The true basis of democratic government, he wrote, "is the equal 
right of every citizen, in his person and property, and in their.manage-
ment."130 Self-government assumes an ability in the commoner not 
only to elect his leaders, but to regulate his affairs as well. And Jefferson 
was "optimistic ... that the people have been made competent for self-
government."131 Limiting state intrusion into personal autonomy, 
therefore, was an essential component of a broader Jeffersonian pro-
gram launched in the "name of the natural equality of man" to "[lay] 
the axe to the foot ofpsuedo-aristocracy."132 His efforts to abolish en-
tail and primogeniture, secure religious liberty, eliminate property qual-
ifications for elected office, and broaden electoral participation were 
similar cornerstones in a "foundation laid for a government truly re-
publican."133 In short, Jefferson opted for a political system premised 
upon tolerance rather than persecution, and reason rather than coer-
cion, to foster both democratic ideals and the intrinsic value of human 
beings. No doubt the circle of his vision, like that of his contemporaries, 
was tragically narrow. Whole segments of the society of his day were 
excluded from full membership in the American polity. Yet the theory 
127. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Law (June 13, 1814) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 542. 
128. 
Man was destined for society. His morality therefore was to be formed to this object. He 
was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense is as 
much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation 
of morality. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787) in JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 424. 
129. Id. at 425. 
130. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in JEFFERSON, 
supra note 41, at 555. 
131. D. BooRSTJN, supra note 90, at 181. 
132. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 537. See also M. PETERsoN, ADAMS AND JEFFERSON; A REVOLUTIONARY DIALOGUE 22-23 
(1976). 
133. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 62 (1959). 
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of government he introduced assumed a community sharing a common 
humanity. It invited its citizens to promote in themselves the humanity 
which bound them to each other. Two centuries of struggle have dra-
matically expanded the circle of those considered competent, autono-
mous, and fully-participating members of society. The theory of gov-
ernment to which Jefferson sought to dedicate the fledging nation 
demands that all its members be assumed competent to govern the di-
rection of their own lives. 
B. Lincoln and Rededication 
The poet ... drags the dead out of their coffins and stands 
them again on their feet ... he says to the past, Rise and 
walk before me that I may realize you. 134 
-WALT WHITMAN 
If Jefferson attempted to carve out democratic governing princi-
ples for the United States, Lincoln attempted to save them. The tragic 
American embrace of slavery triggered an eventual and unavoidable re-
examination of our national commitments to liberty and equality. Ar-
guments over the extension of slavery into the territories rekindled long 
smouldering conflicts and threatened the continued vitality of com-
promises institutionalized by the framers of the original compact. Inevi-
tably, the meaning and relevance of the Declaration of Independence 
were brought into play. Following earlier arguments by John Calhoun, 
proponents of slavery or of "states rights" offered a variety of interpre-
tations or reformulations of the Declaration.135 Its terms were argued 
to implicitly exclude blacks, 136 guarantee state equality, 13 7 claim only 
that Americans were equal to British, 138 or even to be no more than 
"self-evident lies." 139 Opponents of slavery deemed the continuation of 
the institution fatally inconsistent with a government dedicated to free-
dom for all. Simply put, in the decades preceeding the Civil War, the 
slavery issue re-focused national attention to unanswered questions 
concerning those ideals for which our society stood. The Illinois senato-
rial campaign of 1858 between Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln 
offered the most pointed, and probably the most literate, debates over 
the American constitutional ethos in our history. 
134. Preface toW. WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS (1926). 
135. See C. Becker, supra note 90, at 251-52. See also 3 THE CoLLECTED WoRKS OF ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN 301 (R. Basler ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as 3 LINCOLN WORKS}. 
136. 2 LINCOLN WORKS, supra note 105, at 405. 
137. /d. at 385. 
138. /d. at 406. 
139. 3 LINCOLN WORKS, supra note 135, at 301-02. 
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Responding to Judge Douglas' claims for "popular sovereignty" 
and support for the Dred Scott decision, Lincoln called for a rededica-
tion to the literal meaning of the Declaration. To Lincoln's mind, on 
the question of liberty, we were not what we once had been: 
When we were the political slaves of King George, and 
wanted to be free, we called the maxim that "all men are cre-
ated equal" a self-evident truth, but now when we have grown 
fat, and have lost all dread of being slaves ourselves, we have 
become so greedy to be masters that we call the same maxim 
"a self-evident lie." 140 
Accordingly, the persistent theme of both Lincoln's unsuccessful 
1858 senatorial campaign and his presidency was that the nation "re-
adopt the Declaration oflndependence, and ... the practices and policy 
which harmonize with it." 141 For Lincoln, "our republican robe" had 
been "soiled and trailed in the dust." 142 Rededicating ourselves to the 
principles of Jefferson-"the definitions and axioms of a free soci-
ety"143 -would serve "to repurify it." 144 No doubt he saw his major 
presidential mission as the saving of the Union. But he believed just as 
profoundly that it was essential to "have so saved it as to make and 
keep it worthy of the saving."145 That necessitated we "reinaugurate 
the good old 'central ideas' of the Republic" reflected in the 
Declaration. 146 
Lincoln, of course, was well aware of the seeming inconsistencies 
of the Declaration. As Martin Luther King, Jr. reminded a century 
later: "that document was always a declaration of intent rather than of 
reality." 147 Slavery was only the grossest of the "realities" which 
haunted it. In truth, of course, the "all" who were "created equal" were 
at best white, propertied males. Lincoln argued, however, that the 
framers of the Declaration: 
did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then 
actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about 
to confer it immediately upon them .... They meant simply to 
140. 2 LINCOLN WoRKS, supra note 105, at 318. See also Bestor, State Sovereignty and 
Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Pros/avery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860, 54 J. ILL. ST. HIST. 
Soc'Y 117 (1961) (claiming that Southern states' rights arguments were assertions of power, not 
rights; and that Republican rebuttal was based on claims of rights). 
141. SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 44-45 (T.H. Williams ed. 
1943) (hereinafter cited as SELECTED WRITINGS]. 
142. ld. 
143. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 488-89. 
144. SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 44. 
145. !d. at 45. 
146. 2 LINCOLN WORKS, supra note 105, at 385. 
147. M.L. KiNG, JR., WORDS OF MARTIN LUTIIER KiNG 52 (1983). 
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declare the right, so that enforcement of it might follow as cir-
cumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard 
maxim for a free society, which could be familiar to all, and 
revered by all constantly looked to, constantly labored for, 
and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approxi-
mated, thereby constantly spreading and deepening its 
influence .... 148 
To Lincoln, therefore, the "sentiment" of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence "was that which gave promise that in due time the weights would 
be lifted from the shoulders of all." 149 
Nor, for Lincoln, was the decision whether to cling to the Declara-
tion an inconsequential one. The noble experiment of self-government 
hung in the balance. "Most governments," he wrote, "have been based, 
practically, on the denial of the equal rights of men." 150 Ours, on the 
other hand, "began by affirming those rights." 151 Refusing to be ruled 
by the belief that some are too "ignorant, and vicious" to share in gov-
ernment, our commitment to democracy supposed that if all are given a 
chance, "the weak [would] grow stronger, the ignorant, wiser, and all 
better, and happier together." 152 Yet these very principles were openly 
endangered. "It is now no child's play," Lincoln argued, "to save the 
principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation." 153 The 
Civil War itself, he believed, was being fought over the ideal of true self-
government. Speaking to the special session of Congress called to ratify 
his early actions to defend the Union, he made the point clearly: 
This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union 
it is a struggle for the maintaining in the world that form and 
substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the 
condition of men-to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; 
to clear the paths of laudable pursuits for all .... Yielding to 
partial and temporary departures, from necessity, this is the 
leading object of the government for whose existence we 
contend. 1 54 
This is the essential theme of another of our fundamental constitu-
tive documents, the Gettysburg Address. Speaking at a battlesight 
148. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 361. 
149. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Feb. 
22, 1861) in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 113. 
150. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 279. 
151. /d. 
152. !d. 
153. !d. at 489. 
154. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861) in SE-
LECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 139-40. 
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which he hoped would signal a changing tide in the war effort, Lincoln 
proclaimed to both North and South, and to the world, the purposes of 
the war and the purposes of the nation. The struggle sought to deter-
mine whether a nation "conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal," could endure. 155 The 
"great task remaining before" those who survived the awful conflict 
was to "be here dedicated to ... a new birth of freedom," 156 so that 
democratic government would not perish from the earth. 
It is not coincidence, of course, that Lincoln employed the procrea-
tive metaphor. The framers' efforts had been attempts-with "tempo-
rary departures from necessity"-to launch a true republic. Under the 
weight of slavery, however, the endeavor was floundering. Not only had 
the past half-century offered little concrete progress towards democrati-
zation, strong voices now sought, in Lincoln's view, to set a different 
course. The Civil War, therefore, demanded a rededication to the 
founding principles if the Union were to remain "worthy of the sav-
ing." Otherwise, the "experiment"157 would be stillborn. 
Primarily, of course, we consider Lincoln's legacy a re-commit-
ment to equality. Its central focus was the assurance that the phrase "all 
men are created equal" included black men as well as white ones-an 
obvious precursor of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments. But his reassertion of Jeffersonian political philosophy was far 
broader than the mere demand for equal treatment. Equality alone, 
without a fundamental commitment to personal liberty as well, fell 
short of Lincoln's concept of self-government. 
It is not surprising that Lincoln spoke with far greater affection for 
the Declaration than the Constitution itself. The founding Charter had 
hardly been friendly to the cause of black freedom. 158 It was no mis-
take that at Gettysburg he had dated the founding of the republic at 
1776 rather than 1789.1 59 In Lincoln's view, our constitutive principles 
were more basic and more profound than the specifics set forth in the 
text. Framing an illustration based upon Biblical metaphor, 160 and 
echoing the sentiments of the ninth amendment, he explained: 
There is something back of [the Constitution and the Union] 
entwining itself more closely about the human heart. That 
something, is the principle of "Liberty to all"-the principle 
that clears the path for all-gives hope to all-and, by conse-
155. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 734. 
156. Id. 
!57. SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 45. 
158. The text of the original Constitution essentially described slaves as three-fifths 
human. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 2, cl. 3. 
159. See G. WILLS, supra note 90, at xiv-xv. 
160. See Proverbs 25: II. 
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quence, enterprise and industry to all. The expression of that 
principle in our Declaration of Independence . . . was the 
word ''fitly spoken" which has proved an "apple of gold" to 
us. The Union and the Constitution, are the picture of silver, 
subsequently framed around it. The picture was made, not to 
conceal or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The 
picture was made for the apple-not the apple for the picture. 
So let us act, that neither picture, or apple shall ever be 
blurred, bruised or broken. 161 
Lincoln's principle "liberty to all," for which he claimed the Con-
stitution was subsequently framed, embodies the joint American ideals 
of autonomy and equality. Equality, in this most fundamental sense, 
was relatively easy to comprehend, even if hellish to actually bring 
about. It demanded the increased expansion of those groups of individ-
uals considered full participating members of the political commu-
nity.162 But what of Lincoln's concept of liberty? 
In the debates with Senator Douglas, Lincoln recalled Jefferson 
and repeatedly defined liberty as follows: "I believe each individual is 
naturally entitled to do as he pleases with himself and the fruit of his 
labor, so far as it in no wise interferes with any other man's rights." 163 
He reiterated the definition as president. 164 But even more clearly than 
Jefferson, Lincoln tied the concept of personal autonomy to the com-
mitment to self-government: 
I trust I understand and truly estimate the right of self-gov-
ernment. My faith in the proposition that each man should do 
precisely as he pleases with all that is exclusively his own lies 
at the foundation of the sense of justice there is in me. I extend 
the principle to communities of men as well as to individu-
161. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (R. Baslered. 1953) (hereinafter 
cited as 4 LINCOLN WORKS]. 
162. See SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 140.1t has been argued that the Republi-
can Party's pre-Civil War platform, which sought to prevent the spread of slavery into the territo-
ries, was not pro-black. Rather, it was designed to stop the institution of slavery from becoming 
national in scope and thereby destroying the white free labor system. E. FoNER, FREE SoiL, FREE 
LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 301-317 
(1970). Lincoln's hope for colonization ·of the former slaves is perhaps consistent with this claim. 
Even so, it does not run counter to the concept of self-governance. If Lincoln believed at the time, 
as is likely, that blacks and whites may have difficulty living in equal circumstance, he perhaps 
considered colonization so that the entire political community of both groups might achieve self-
government. 
163. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 394. 
164. Abraham Lincoln, Address at a Sanitary Fair (Apr. 18, 1864) in LINCOLN, supra note 
92, at 748. 
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als .... The doctrine of self-government is right-absolutely 
and eternally right. 165 
1333 
For both Jefferson and Lincoln, therefore, democracy entailed two 
distinct components of self-government. The first, and that on which we 
customarily focus attention, is the ability of the entire community, 
through its representatives, to enact and enforce the laws which shall 
regulate its interaction. Second, and perhaps more clearly tied to demo-
cratic commitment to personal worth, self-government assumes that, 
absent threat of harm to others, decisions concerning how life should be 
led are to be left to individuals. Both considered personal autonomy, so 
defined, to lie "back of," or predate the Constitution itself. Both be-
lieved that this general concept of liberty represented a key feature of 
the American constitutive ethos which is only partially addressed by 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights. For Jefferson, such a vision of 
the relationship between the individual and the state was a cornerstone 
of a true republic. Lincoln successfully fought to "recontract"166 our 
polity on that basis. Both saw private self-government as the "sheet-
anchor of American republicanism." 167 
C. Jeffersonian Thought in a Non-Jeffersonian World 
[Our constitutional] principles grew in soil which also pro-
duced a philosophy that the individual was the center of 
society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence 
of governmental restraints, and that government should be 
entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision 
over men's affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil 
in which the laissez-faire concept ... has withered ... and 
social advancements are increasingly sought through closer 
integration of society ... and strengthened governmental 
controls. 168 
-JUSTICE JACKSON 
Gleaning constitutional rights from Jeffersonian thought, as re-
fined and embraced by Lincoln, is controversial for a variety of reasons. 
Moving beyond the language of the Bill of Rights towards a claimed 
commitment to a particular relationship between the individual and he~ 
165. SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 37. 
166. G. WILLS, supra note 90, at xiv. 
167. SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 37. Jefferson argued that the "true founda-
tion of republican government is the equal right of every citizen, in his person and property, and in 
their management." JEFFERSON, supra note 130, at SSS. 
168. West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,639-40 (1943). 
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government is troubling enough. It is also true, however, that Jefferso-
nian individualism is but one strain in our political history, and that the 
world of late 20th century America is drastically different than that of 
the founders. Further, it is obvious that the tool used by Jefferson and 
Lincoln to measure the scope of personal autonomy-harm to others-
is essentially the same as that subsequently developed and honed by 
John Stuart Mill. 169 lt is subject, therefore, to the same attacks for in-
determinancy and even vacuousness to which Mills' work has been sub-
jected. These objections can be met-or, at least, deflected below, where 
I explore Jeffersonian liberty as a modern concept. Searching for the 
core of its meaning-in his time as well as our own-I attempt to justify 
the concept of self-governance. 
Jefferson's political philosophy has been ascribed to the liberal tra-
dition drawn from Locke and Hobbes. 170 That characterization seems 
the correct one, despite a recent attempt to call it into question. 171 
Since my arguments turn on the language of Jefferson rather than some 
conceptual overlay of Lockean individualism, 172 however, that debate 
is not central to my claims. Another contemporary debate, though, di-
rectly confronts an attempt to constitutionalize the core aspects of Jef-
fersonian liberty. 
While Lockean individualism was once thought to have provided 
the sole touchstone of American political thought, modern historians 
have recognized that a quite distinct civic republican tradition has con-
tributed to our ideological origins as well. 173 Civic republicanism, to 
generalize, downplays the individualism of liberal political theory con-
centrating instead on the development of social institutions so as to 
foster the public good. If the liberal ethic would leave individuals alone 
to pursue their own interests and ends, the republican ethic attempts to 
refine civic virtue, orienting citizens to a common good beyond their 
individual interests. 174 It could be argued, therefore, that looking at 
169. See J.S. MILL, supra note 119. 
170. See C. BECKER, supra note 90, at 79 ("The Americans did not borrow it, they inher-
ited it. The lineage is direct: Jefferson copied Locke and Locke quoted Hooker."). 
171. See G. WILLS, supra note 90. 
172. David A.J. Richards has fashioned an interesting body of work basing constitutional 
analysis on Lockean individualism. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 75; Richards, Conscience, 
Human Rights and the Anarchist Challenge to the Obligation to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REv. 771, 
772-776 (1984); Richards, The Individual, The Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Per-
spective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1980); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to 
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 
(1979). 
173. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); C. ROBBINS, THE EtGHTEilNTH 
CENTuRY CoMMONWEALTH MAN (1959); G. WtLLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981); 
G. WOOD, supra note 39; Shalhope, Toward A Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of An Under-
standing of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972). 
174. See generally G. WtLL, supra note 5. 
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Jeffersonian thought alone suggests only a part (though clearly the 
dominant part) of our political heritage. 
The actual influence of civic republicanism on the framing of the 
Constitution has recently been heatedly challenged. 175 Even so, it may 
be mistaken to characterize a Jeffersonian commitment to personal au-
tonomy as inconsistent with civic republicanism. Jefferson's writings re-
veal a belief that governmental coercion works to undermine, rather 
than to enhance, civic virtue. The polity as a whole enjoys greater prog-
ress under the "duperies of the people" than the "egoism of their 
agents." 176 Further, for Jefferson, the sovereignty of individual con-
science provides the cornerstone of our civil religion. Self-governance is 
one of the principle tenets of "our political faith," a "text of our civil 
instruction," 177 and an essential tool if true civic virtue is to be 
fostered. 
At a more fundamental level, the debate over the source of Ameri-
can tradition-virtue or will-does not detract from a claim that we 
have sought to guarantee self-governance. My argument is premised 
upon the breadth of the ninth amendment and an asserted commitment 
to personal sovereignty. It is, at bottom, an argument about the way in 
which the Bill of Rights should be interpreted. Although there is rea-
sonable dispute over the various influences of liberal or republican 
thought in the framing of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights itself falls 
clearly in the liberal camp. Madison described it as a list of "private 
rights," 178 and characterized the entire framework as merely restating 
"the perfect equality of mankind." 179 Although Madison's early wa-
vering on the Bill of Rights may have reflected a substantial bow to civic 
republicanism, 180 he eventually supported and even introduced the 
measures in Congress. Turning to an explicitly liberal justification for a 
charter of rights, he argued that "independent tribunals of justice will 
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of the Bill of 
Rights." 181 Its prohibitions of power, in short, were designed to pro-
vide a bulwark against defects in republican virtue. Like Jefferson, 
Madison concluded that a Bill of Rights "is of great potency always, 
175. SeeJ. DIGGINS, THE LosT SoUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND 
THE FouNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1985) (arguing that classic republicanism was an idea whose 
time had come, and gone, by 1787). 
176. See supra note 126. 
177. See supra note 147. 
178. RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 1030-31. 
179. /d. at 1029. 
180. "To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without 
any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea." James Madison, Address to Virginia Convention 
(June 20, 1788) in THE CoMPLETE MADISON 339 (S. Padover ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as CoM-
PLETE MADISON]. Jefferson has been credited with converting Madison to the idea of a Bill of 
Rights. See L. LEVY, supra note 90, at 3. 
181. I ANNALS OF CoNGRESS, supra note 63, at 439. 
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and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often keep up the build-
ing which would have fallen with that brace the less." 182 
Still, even if Jefferson's and Lincoln's concepts of individual auton-
omy are conceded to be instructive concerning the demands of constitu-
tional liberty, much work is left to be done. Their worlds are not our 
own. ln many particulars, they are "lost" to us. 183 Many of the prem-
ises which led Jefferson to foster autonomy have been rejected by our 
society over the course of the past two centuries. The firm belief in a 
benevolent God directing the course of the universe, trust in the ra-
tional intelligence and goodwill of individuals, the creed that the gov-
ernment which governs least governs best, and the assertion that the 
welfare of its citizens is not the concern of the state, have all been 
shaken from their earlier predominant places in our thought. The inter-
dependence of a modern technological society suggests as well that Jef-
fersonian liberty may be a relic best left aside. 
Jefferson's embrace of autonomy in non-injurious private deci-
sion-making was but one part of a far broader political philosophy. 
That philosophy placed its heaviest184 reliance on freedom as a nega-
tive principle, the absence of restraint. Whereas society results from the 
virtues of women and men, government flows from their vices. If freed 
from the heavy hand of state suppression, individuals would thrive in a 
community of brotherhood, fed by an innate morality and supported 
by the progress wrought of increased knowledge. Government, so con-
templated, is at best a necessary evil which perpetually poses danger to 
individual prosperity through its tendencies toward expansion. 185 Lov-
ers of human development, therefore, should be lovers of limited 
government. 
In practical terms this meant that in the political realm Jefferson 
thought that the power of government should be limited to the protec-
tion of civil order. In the economic sphere he assumed that the free play 
of private initiative would produce optimum wealth. In the interna-
tional arena, Jefferson assumed that strict dedication to national inter-
ests by each sovereign would produce the most appropriate balances of 
power and trade. 186 Automatically, the basically unrestrained pursuit 
of self-interest would foster the public good. Since it was not the job of 
government to mold the ideal society, his political philosophy focused 
182. JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 439. 
183. See D. BOORSTIN, supra note 90. 
184. Jefferson, however, was strongly committed to the development of public education, 
proposing bills amending the Constitution of the College of William & Mary in 1779 and establish-
ing a system of public education in 1817. He also, of course, helped to establish the University of 
Virginia. See L. LEVY, supra note 90, at 9-13. 
185. See generally Becker, supra note 91, at 46-58. 
186. Id. at 56. 
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almost exclusively on where government should not intrude. His lais-
sez-faire offered little indication, on the other hand, of where it ought to 
go.187 
That world view seems strangely simplistic in the latter decades of 
the 20th century. All but the most sentimental libertarians-yearning 
for a supposed golden era-recognize its demise. Many of the premises 
which sustained Jefferson's political philosophy are less familiar as well. 
World wars and holocausts have shaken any belief in the moral 
perfectability of mankind. The massive interdependency of modern so-
ciety has blurred the distinctions between private and governmental de-
cision-making. Most importantly, however, our view of the appropriate 
scope of government power and concern has been fundamentally al-
tered. No longer, to our way of thinking, is it mandatory or even ac-
ceptable for government to be unconcerned about the welfare of its 
citizens. 
I spoke earlier of Jefferson and Lincoln shepharding the nation 
through two of its primary constitutive phases, 188 the founding and the 
Civil War. The Great Depression and the federal government's re-
sponse to it are appropriately characterized as a third. The New Deal 
accomplished one of the few successful gradualist revolutions in his-
tory, centralizing power in the national government in order to temper 
the harsh effects of economic self-interest run rampant. 189 The adop-
tion of the principles of the welfare state assumed at least a partial rejec-
tion of pure Lockean individualism in favor of social minded commu-
nity. In the words of Franklin Roosevelt, the "New Deal [sought] to 
cement our society, rich and poor, manual workers and brain workers, 
into a voluntary brotherhood of free men, standing together striving 
together for the common good of all." 190 Thus, the United States of the 
New Deal and the Great Society poses considerable tension with Jeffer-
son's America. Far more than any theoretical concern for a long lost 
civic republicanism, the conflict between Jeffersonian individualism and 
Rooseveltian brotherhood obscures our political tradition. 
Still, our rejection of the Jeffersonian view of the relationship be-
tween the individual and the state has been but partial. We have con-
ceded, after a struggle, 191 that property and the power it carries come 
187. See D. BooRSTIN, supra note 90, at 195. 
188. The notion of constitutive phases used here partially parallels a much more elaborate 
scheme of constitutional interpretation set forth in Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering 
The Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). 
189. See generally J.M. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 161-291 (1956); A. 
SCHLESINGER, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL (1960); A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 
(1959). 
190. N. MILLER, FOR: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 344 (1983). 
191. See G. GuNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 448-470 (11th ed. 1985). 
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"clothed with a public interest." 192 Accordingly, the state can appro-
priately regulate it to promote the public good. We are less willing to 
make the same concessions for the human conscience. 
Our hesitance shows itself in a number of ways. It perhaps explains 
the persistent struggle in constitutional law to identify preferred or fun-
damental human interests. 193 Even as the Supreme Court capitulated 
to the New Deal in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 194 it began 
to formulate an argument in that case's famous footnote that all human 
liberties are not defeasible under perceived visions of the public inter-
est.195 More pointedly, we seem to cling stubbornly to Jefferson's rec-
ognition of democracy as an assertion of values about the worth of 
human beings. 196 Vigorous protection of rights of expression197 and 
equality198 have been premised in major part on the Jeffersonian vision 
of individual dignity. And we consider it profoundly inconsistent with 
our legacy as Americans to be told by our government what is best for 
us. 
One of the primary goals of constitutional decision-making, there-
fore, is to determine the appropriate breadth to be given to basic com-
mitments to autonomy in a highly interdependent, increasingly techno-
logical society. What sorts of individual interests should be secured, 
honed, expanded or diluted in the face of a changing cultural atmos-
phere? Unlike Jefferson, we have concluded that there are specific moral 
ends to be served by government. Those include not only guarantees of 
security, both foreign and domestic, but the assistance and sheltering of 
the most unfortunate among us. But like Jefferson we search for a sanc-
tuary of human autonomy insusceptible to invasion by government. 
The uncertainties posed by attempts to maneuver such a line are 
substantial. The task itself, however, has been fairly clearly described. 
This subsection began with a quotation from Justice Jackson's remark-
able opinion in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette. 199 Jackson 
argued that one of the primary, and most difficult, tasks of constitu-
tional interpretation was to "transplant" the ideals of the framers "to a 
192. See Patterson, Property Rights In The Balance-The Burger Court and Constitutional 
Property, 43 Mo. L. REv. 518, 531 (1984). 
193. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 191, at 787-854. 
194. 304 u.s. 144 (1938). 
195. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
196. /d. 
197. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 
94, 156-65 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17,25 (1968); Everson v. 
Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. I, 16 (1947); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 645-46; Little, Thomas Jefferson's 
Religious Views and Their Influence on the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 
26 CATH. U.L. REv. 57 (1976). 
198. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964). 
199. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
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soil in which the laissez-faire concept ... has withered ... and social 
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of so-
ciety ... and strengthened government controls."200 The religion 
clauses provide a ready example of both the necessity and the intracta-
bility of the interpretive task Jackson identified. The religion clauses 
may well have been designed to erect a "wall" separating church and 
state.201 In a modern society in which government reaches repeatedly 
into our homes and our schools, however, complete separation may 
work to endanger values of religious exercise which the first amendment 
was designed to secure. Accordingly, rather than blindly insisting upon 
separation, the Justices necessarily attempt to "transplant" the values 
reflected in the religion clauses to a more complex society. Jefferson's 
call for absolute personal autonomy absent harm to others is perhaps, 
as well, only imperfectly "transplantable" into the soil of modern 
American society. The neat boundaries Jefferson envisioned separating 
the various prerogatives of the individual, state government, and fed-
eral government have become blurred. Still, our constitutional ethos 
includes a core of Jeffersonian commitment to self-governance which 
we surrender at our peril. 
Even so, the very formulation of the Jeffersonian vision of the ap-
propriate sphere of personal autonomy must be examined. Both Jeffer-
son and Lincoln embraced what we now consider a Millian concept of 
individual liberty. Jefferson claimed that "[t]he legitimate powers of 
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others."202 Lin-
coln, altering the phrase, argued that each is "entitled to do as he 
pleases with himself and the fruit of his labor, so far as it in no wise 
interferes with any other man's rights .... " 203 Madison echoed such 
sentiments. 204 
But, without more, the Millian concept of self-regarding acts, as 
has been widely noted, is potentially incoherent and scrupulously inde-
200. /d. at 639-40. 
201. In Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. I, 16 (1947), the Supreme Coun stated: "In the 
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall 
of separation between church and state.' " See 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H. Wash-
ington ed. 1854). Justice Rehnquist has recently challenged the propriety of following the Jefferso-
nian version of separation. See Wallace v. J affree, 105 S. Ct. 24 79, 2508-2520 (1985) (Rehnquist, J ., 
dissenting). 
202. JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 210-11. 
203. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 394. 
204. See CoMPLETE MADISON, supra note 180, at 267. All enjoy an "equal property in the 
free use of[thel faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them." "Government is 
instituted to protect property of every sort; as well as that which lies in the various rights of indi-
viduals .... This being the end of government, that alone is a just government which impartially 
secures to every man, whatever is his own . ... " /d. at 267-68 (emphasis in original). 
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terminate. 205 As the law of standing aptly demonstrates, determining 
what is "injury" is no simple task. 206 A Jeffersonian/Millian view of 
liberty, one assumes, would reject regulations barring conduct merely 
because of the displeasure such acts create in the minds of third parties. 
Yet we all seem to concede the propriety of statutes prohibiting public 
sexual acts. Some psychic disturbances, apparently, can be shielded 
through the use of legal sanction. What then of legislation making it 
illegal for gay couples to hold hands in public? Or an arrest for wearing 
a tee shirt inscribed "Fuck the Ayatollah"? The answers do not flow 
easily from asking only which actions are "injurious to others." 
Harm to property, of course, is easily reached by government even 
under the Millian formulation. Yet, to ask the question of the sages, 
"What is property?" May not it be thought to include, with the help of 
legislative enactment, the interest of a wife in her husband's fidelity?207 
Well, one might respond, not if Millian liberty is to be vibrant and ac-
complish its task of laying waste to morals legislation. A plethora of 
intangible interests, however, have been recognized as property when 
given the shield of positive law. 208 If a "right" to commit adultery is to 
be saved as a core aspect of autonomy, it must have something to do 
with the centrality of sexual choice and expression to human develop-
ment. Absence of harm alone does not get you from here to there. 
Nor is the notion of self-regarding acts any less elusive. The Mil-
lian formula is obviously aimed heavily at paternalism. But if I smoke 
five packages of cigarettes a day, develop lung cancer at fifty, rob soci-
ety of twenty years of productive service, and become a public charge 
with thousands of dollars of hospital bills to be carried by the state, can 
my smoking be considered a non-injurious act? The mutual concern 
ushered in by the New Deal necessarily results in mutual duties and 
mutual harms. It is likely true that any action leads to consequences 
well beyond the scope of a pre-ordained perimeter of individual con-
cem.209 No one, as it goes, is an island. 
Finally, consider the question of causation. What causes harm? "If 
I fail to respond to starvation in Ethiopia, do I cause death abroad?" 210 
205. See, e.g., Professor Grey's excellent short work on the relationship between Millian 
liberty and legal sanction. T. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 6-33 (1983). See a/so 
P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). 
206. See J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE CoMING OF AGE OF PuBLIC LAW (1978); Nichol, 
Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 653-54 (1985); Nichol, 
Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68 (1984). 
207. See T. GREY, supra note 205, at 10-20. 
208. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (interest in reputation as 
property); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare rights as property). But see Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (limiting Constantineau). 
209. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 888 (1978). 
210. See T. GREY, supra note 205, at 23-33. 
1985:1305 Children of Distant Fathers 1341 
If I, as a Congressman, vote to cut off Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, do I cause it here? The interdependence of American soci-
ety-far more pronounced than in Jefferson's day-weakens any at-
tempt to define the relationship between the individual and the state 
solely in negative terms. Interrelationship-not only between ourselves 
and our government, but between ourselves and our fellow humans-
robs the Jeffersonian definition ofliberty of its earlier power. Focusing 
exclusively on the harm, or the lack thereof, caused by particular con-
duct neither works perfectly as a tool for decision-making nor captures 
completely the essence of the Jeffersonian plea for autonomy. If per-
sonal freedom is assured, for example, in order to foster self-develop-
ment, it may well be that the "freedom" to have an impact upon others 
is essential to any healthy sense of identity. 211 As Hannah Arendt has 
written, to "live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived 
of things essential to a truly human life."212 There is slippage in both 
directions. · 
IV. A RIGHT OF SELF-GoVERNANCE 
Nature and human life are as various as our several consti-
tutions. Who shall say what prospects life offers to another? 
Could a greater miracle take place than to look through 
each others' eyes for an instant?213 
-H.D. THOREAU 
If the yardstick which Jefferson used to measure the expanse of 
individual liberty misses the mark in an interdependent, technological 
society, his rationale for drawing the line is more illuminating. At bot-
tom, the Jeffersonian view of individual liberty reflects a set of political 
and moral value judgments-a way of "regarding man and the life of 
man."214 Those values, he believed, are implicit in commitment tore-
211. See L. TRIBE, supra note 209, at 886-89. 
212. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 58 (1958). See also R. UNGER, PASSION: AN 
EssAY ON PERsoNALITY 98-104 (1984). 
213. H.D. THOREAU, WALDEN, reprinted in THE PoRTABLE THOREAU 266 (C. Bode ed. 
1977). 
214. Becker, supra note 91, at 60. Obviously, I part company somewhat here with Sanford 
Levinson. In reviewing Wills' book on the Declaration of Independence, Levinson claims that it 
" ... is simply not open to an intellectually sophisticated modern thinker to share Jefferson's 
world." Levinson, Book Review, 57 TEX. L. REv. 847,856 (1979). Never having laid claim to either 
sophistication or modernism, I am undeterred by the remark. In truth, however, I make no claim 
that we can embrace Jefferson's world jot-for-jot, nor that we should so desire. I argue instead that 
the American vision of personal liberty is tied to Jefferson's view of the relationship between the 
individual and the state. 
I am puzzled, however, about Levinson's stance in the review. He praises Wills and yet 
refers to Daniel Boors tin's, The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson, as a "brilliant work." /d. at 856~ 
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publican government. They provide the grounding principles of 
democracy. 
Jefferson's embrace of "personal liberty" to engage in conduct 
"non-injurious to others" was designed to secure a refuge of human 
freedom shielded from the intrusion of the state. For him such a safe 
haven was essential in order to serve two fundamental democratic prin-
ciples: the belief that competent human beings are capable of making 
their own decisions about how life should be led, and the commitment 
to treating all members of the political community as equals. 215 A right 
to self-governance serves these twin aims. 
Jefferson's dedication to autonomy resulted from his perceptions 
of the shortcomings of the "old world." For too many centuries, the 
mass of human beings had been considered the subjects of emperors, 
kings, aristocrats and clergymen-dependent, in their liberties, upon 
the good graces of their masters. The American experiment turned to a 
different premise, claiming that the guarantees of personhood were de-
rived "from the laws of nature, and not the gift[s] of the chief magis-
trate." 216 Whether the argument of natural right itself constitutes noth-
ing more than "a sound to dispute about"217 is in this sense beside the 
point. The distinction had been drawn. Personal liberties, at least in 
certain core particulars, inhere in the status of being fully human. As 
John Kennedy would explain much later, we are heirs of a revolution 
which assumes that human rights "come not from the generosity of the 
state but from the hand of God."218 
The inalienable characteristics with which men and women are 
"endowed" include not only the liberty, but the competence to rule 
themselves. They no more need to be told by government how to make 
themselves happy than they need to be told how to vote. That "pursuit" 
is left to the individual. Nor, for Jefferson, had the Creator bungled his 
work. A creature placed upon the earth to live in social circumstances 
must be capable of successfully directing her quest for happiness with-
out the dictates of a supposed superior, whether that superior claims his 
status by divine right, birth, or allegedly elevated moral insight. The 
very premise of self-government requires no less. 
Wills major effort, however, is to show that Boorstin "describes the lost world of Benjamin Rush," 
not Thomas Jefferson. G. WILLS, supra note 90, at 200. I find it hard to understand how both can 
be right. 
21 S. SeeR. DWORKIN, TAKING RiGHTS SERIOUSLY 270-74 (1976); Richards, supra note 36, 
at 8. 
216. Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, reprinted in JEFFERSON, 
supra note 41, at 20. 
217. J. BENlHAM, 8 WORKS OF JEREMY BENlHAM 577 reprinted in H.L.A. HART, EssAYS ON 
BENlHAM 82 (1982). 
218. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961) in R. HoFSTADTER & B. HoF-
STADTER, GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 450 (1982). 
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The competence of even common persons to shape the course of 
their own lives carries other ramifications for the appropriate scope of 
government powers. If individuals enjoy a sense of moral equality, then 
it is beyond the state's legitimate authority to attempt to foster its 
"blueprint" of the moral life. Such efforts to forcibly elevate the moral 
worth of the citizenry, or to impose the moral sentiments of one seg-
ment of the community upon another, represent "egoism" and insult to 
independent moral agents. Jefferson's attempted wall insulating non-
injurious acts from government regulation was thus designed primarily 
to give broad recognition to the value of human autonomy, the first 
principle of self-government. 219 
But respect for autonomy is only half of the Jeffersonian liberty 
equation. Without a concept of protected personal freedom, equality 
itself is endangered. As Jefferson declared in his first inaugural, our re-
public is premised on "our equal right to the use of our own faculties, to 
the acquisitions of our industry, to honor and confidence from our fel-
low citizens."220 No doubt for Jefferson, as for Mill, "he who sets his 
own plan employs all his faculties." 221 Potentially, therefore, when so-
ciety dictates the moral "plan" of its citizenry, it denies to some of its 
citizens the equal use of their faculties. It fails without good reason (i.e., 
harm) to afford "honor and confidence" to the life choices of its mem-
bers. Instead, as Ronald Dworkin has argued, government insults its 
citizens when it abrogates their moral independence. 222 The "profes-
sor" degrades the "plowman" by dictating what is in his best interest. 
The state denies my equality when it attempts to save my soul by force. 
The line between injurious and non-injurious action was an effort to 
distinguish valid regulation from insult-to contrast societal protection 
219. In his first inaugural, Jefferson sought to insulate non-injurious acts in order to leave 
individuals "free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement." See JEFFERSON, 
supranote41, at 293; C. BECKER, supra note 90, at 278-79. See also, Richards, supra note 75, at 538, 
"Self-rule of one's conscience is ... a deep ... constitutional value ... not properly the subject of 
political bargaining .... " 
220. JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 292. Note the similarity between Jefferson's demand for 
"honor and confidence from our fellow citizens" and Professor Dworkin's arguments that govern-
ment "must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who are capable of 
suffering and frustration, and respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and 
acting upon intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived." R. DWORKIN, supra note 
215, at 272. 
221. J.S. MILL, supra note 119, at 52. 
222. Professor Dworkin has defended the Millian formulation as designed to distinguish 
liberty as license from "liberty as independence, that is, the status of a person as independent and 
equal rather than subservient." R. DWORKIN, supra note 215, at 262-64. Accordingly, Dworkin 
argues, Mill sought to define political independence so as to foster individual dignity. He at-
tempted, in short, to draw a line between the "regulation that connoted equal respect and the 
regulation that denied it." /d. at 263. I attempt to make similar claims about the political philoso-
phy of Jefferson. The critical distinetion between Millian and Jeffersonian political philosophy for 
purposes of constitutional analysis is the American commitment to the Jeffersonian principle. 
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of all of its members from the denial of some of its members' full 
autonomy. 
Jefferson characterized this sense of moral independence-which I 
have called an interest in self-governance-as the grounding principle 
of American government. "The true foundation of republican govern-
ment," he wrote, "is the equal right of every citizen in his person and 
property and their management." 223 James Madison employed similar 
terms, arguing that a person enjoys "an equal property in the free use of 
his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ 
them."224 In Federalist No. 10, he went so far as to claim that the pro-
tection of the "diversity in the faculties of men" is the "first object of 
government." 225 And Lincoln claimed simply that "the faith ... that 
each ... should do precisely as he pleases with all that is exclusively his 
own lies at the foundation of the sense of justice there is in me." 226 
The key to these various formulations, of course, is intrinsic re-
spect for the dignity of humans. We allow people, so far as is possible, 
to choose the course of their lives because we know that, to be fully 
human, choice is demanded. 227 We respect the choices of our fellow 
citizens so as to afford respect for their humanity. Jefferson, in fact, 
penned his distinction between injurious and non-injurious acts ex-
pressly to carve out an essential space in which we are "free to regulate 
[our] own pursuits of industry and improvement."228 The concept of 
self-governance, as the following section reveals, is designed to serve the 
same ends. The freedom to develop personal "pursuits of industry and 
improvement" was key to the Jeffersonian vision. He assumed that each 
is competent to perform them-for without such competence self gov-
ernment itself would have to be rejected. He likewise assumed that gov-
ernment was incompetent-both practically and as a matter of political 
ethics-to dictate the way in which life should be led. Even if the barri-
ers which Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln sought to construct separat-
ing the spheres of private and public concern have lost their solidity 
over the course of the past century, our commitments to individual sov-
ereignty and dignity-as ends in their own right-have not. 
Jefferson sought to dedicate-and Lincoln to rededicate-this na-
tion to a theory of government which presumes that human develop-
ment and happiness can be entrusted to ordinary human hands. More 
223. JEFFERSON, supra note 130, at 555. 
224. CoMPLETE MADISON, supra note 180, at 267. 
225. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
226. SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 140. 
227. H. NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE 249-50 (1951) ("We make [personal choices} in 
freedom because we must choose. We are not free not to choose. Choice is involved in the resolu-
tion to wait a while before we commit ourselves to a line of action .... We continue to be human 
only by continued choices." See also W. JAMES, ESSAYS IN PRAGMATISM 108-09 (1948). 
228. See supra note 216. 
1985:1305 Children of Distant Fathers 1345 
pointedly, the relevant hands empowered were those of the individual 
being regulated. One of the continuing missions of such a government is 
the removal of "artificial barriers" 229 to self-development. Obviously 
the term "artificial" is a loaded one as it implies that some limitations of 
individual autonomy are appropriate while others are illegitimate. The 
criterion of harm to others is a rough attempt to measure the artificial-
ity of various abrogations of liberty. If it fails to accommodate the in-
terdependency of modem life, a finer tuning of the mode of autonomy 
analysis is required-not the scrapping of first principles. Now, as then, 
a key aspect of our societal ethos is the belief that the driving forces 
towards happiness, actualization, and development, or "industry and 
improvement," lie with the individual. Thus, when a person makes a 
choice in the effort to shape and act upon her own identity-to exercise 
self-governance-state interference should require substantial justifica-
tion. By so limiting our government we reaffirm our belief in the dignity 
and value of our fellows. At the same time, we honor our unfolding 
commitment to equality. We recognize, as Robert Kennedy movingly 
proclaimed, that when we teach that a person is lesser "because of his 
beliefs or the policies he pursues, when [we] teach that those who differ 
from [us] threaten [our] family, then [we] also learn to confront others 
not as fellow citizens but as enemies-to be met not with cooperation 
but with conquest, to be subjugated and mastered."230 
The effort to draw the constitutional line which separates the legiti-
mate activities of the state from the protected realm of individual choice 
is a continuing part of our heritage. The answers formulated by our 
forefathers are not sufficient to meet the problems of our day. But when 
the legitimacy of judicial attempts to draw lines guarateeing personal 
sovereignty is called into question, we do well to recall that we claim, as 
a society, to be dedicated to that task. 
A. Self-Governance-Definition and Scope 
The sheep and the wolf are not agreed on the definition of 
liberty. 231 
-A. LINCOLN 
Claims of illegitimacy have not been the only objections hurled by 
the critics of the privacy cases. A second, and equally vexing problem 
has arisen from attempts to define and measure the scope of an asserted 
229. See D. MAWNE, supra note 90, at 153-54. 
230. See Robert Kennedy, Speech to Cleveland City Club (Apr. 5, 1968) in J. NEWFIELD, 
ROBERT KENNEDY: A MEMOIR 274 (1978). 
231. See supra note 164. 
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right to privacy or autonomy. Explanations of the interests sustained in 
the cases seem, most often, to say either too little or too much. The 
Supreme Court itself has scarcely tried to establish the parameters of a 
privacy claim, 232 and the efforts of commentators have been criticized 
as both subjective and indeterminate. 233 To generalize, pundits have 
argued that privacy analysis can neither be justified by sources of posi-
tive law, nor confined by judicially manageable standards of decision-
making. 
My efforts here, of course, have predominately concerned only the 
first of these areas of dispute. I have proceeded in this fashion for sev-
eral reasons. One is practical. The arguments presented here for the 
legitimacy of autonomy analysis are fairly extensive. Further, though 
the legitimacy and definitional issues are in one sense inextricable, ques-
tions of constitutional pedigree present the first and most vigorously 
asserted hurdle to privacy review. Any argument over the appropriate 
fine tuning of an autonomy right must be premised on a claim that the 
Constitution envisions the protection of some such interest. Legitimacy 
issues have also provided most of the heat in the privacy debate. Argu-
ments of usurpation have formed the central focus of allegations that 
substantive due process review constitutes '"government by 
judiciary."234 
Concentration on the validity of judicial recognition of autonomy 
interests, as opposed to the particulars of definitional issues, can be jus-
tified, therefore, so long as one believes that the shortcomings of any 
proffered definition of self-governance are not fatal to legitimacy. In-
determinancy is indeed a messy aspect of American constitutional 
law. 235 1t is, however, an unavoidable one. 236 The failure to develop a 
consensus definition of, for example, equal protection after one cen-
232. But see Justice Stevens, opinion for the Court in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 
(1977) ("The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least 
two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions"). 
233. See L. TRIBE, supra note 209, at 886-97. "[T]o define the province of privacy dis-
tinctly is impossible." J.F. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 160 (1967). 
234. SeeR. BERGER, supra note 24, at 249-82; L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 79 (1975). 
235. See Singer, The Player and The Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. I, 14-
25 (1984); Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1371-79. 
236. See J. ELY, supra note 24, at 67 ("there does not exist a nontrivial constitutional 
theory which will not involve judgment calls"); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 14 CoLUM L. REv. 
1410, 1432-33 (1974): 
"But it is long past time to recognize the caveats to that 'realism,' and the limits of'gov-
emment by judiciary'-the restraining power of the judicial process, the Court's institu-
tional character, the inability of justices to escape constitutional language and history, 
the history of the nation and of the court and a national subconscious echoing with 
ancestral voices." 
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tury, 237 or freedom of speech or religion after two, 238 cannot reason-
ably be made the basis of an argument that the fourteenth and first 
amendments should not be enforced by the courts. If a constitutional 
interest in self-governance can be justified, we should, nine score years 
after Marbury v. Madison, 239 expect judicial efforts to hone it. Accord-
ingly, I have thought it appropriate here to direct the bulk of my atten-
tion to the claim that non-textual autonomy interests can reasonably be 
seen as constitutional in nature. My consideration of the full breadth of 
a right of self-governance will, therefore, be preliminary, leaving its full 
development to a subsequent article. 
Nevertheless, the grounding premises of a constitutional right to 
autonomy provide substantial guidance in determining the appropriate 
scope of the right. Commentators have characterized the various au-
tonomy interest reflected in the decisions as indicative of a right to "in-
timate association," 240 "control over the intimacies of personal iden-
tity,"241 "moral independence,"242 "preservation of attributes of an 
individual,"243 and "equal citizenship."244 There is much to be gained 
from such suggestions, especially if one is willing to limit an autonomy 
doctrine to sexual and reproductive freedom. Our commitment to self-
regulation, however, extends beyond the bounds of the bedroom. The 
notion of democracy expounded by Jefferson and Lincoln includes be-
lief both in the capacity of individuals to set the course of their own 
lives and the fundamental moral equality of all in deciding which pur-
suits are acceptable. Drawing upon these premises, I define self-govern-
ance more broadly as the ability to formulate, shape, and act upon the 
core aspects of one's sense of identity, character and personality. This 
standard avoids reliance on a constructed boundary between individual 
and state prerogative, such as harm to others, which in a modem soci-
ety becomes increasingly artificial. Rather, the boundaries of self-gov-
ernance tum on the values implicit in democratic government. So de-
fined, the concept incorporates our grounding commitment to the 
237. See, e.g., Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982). 
238. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling The 
Conflict, 41 U. PITI. L. REv. 673 (1980); Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 
72 CALIF. L. REv. 753 (1984); Laycock, Toward A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case 
of Church Labor Relations and The Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); 
Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of 
Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979). 
239. 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803). 
240. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
241. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977). 
242. R. DWORKIN, A MATI'ER OF PRINCIPLE 353-70 (1985). 
243. L. TRIBE, supra note 209, at 889. 
244. Karst, supra note 240, at 663; Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1957). 
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moral concepts of dignity, personality, and independence amid a highly 
interdependent culture. 245 
The right, as gleaned from. our historical commitment, is the flip 
side of our long embraced dedication to self-government. Autonomous, 
self-governing individuals not only choose their leaders and thereby set 
societal policies from their own ranks, they reserve for themselves the 
power to make certain core decisions about how they should lead their 
lives. To use Jefferson's words, government must leave its citizens "free 
to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement" and afford 
"honor and confidence" to the choices made. 246 When the government 
seeks to substantially interfere with such attempts at self-regulation, its 
reasons for doing so must be weighty. 
Under the umbrella of self-governance which I have described, at 
least presumptive claims could be made in the familiar privacy cases-
Griswoldv. Connecticut,247 Eisenstadt v. Baird,248 Roe v. Wade, 249 and 
Carey v. Population Services. 250 Some other claims consistently rejected 
by the Supreme Court, such as unmarried heterosexuat2 51 and homo-
245. SeeR. DwoRKIN, supra note 215, at 262-63. 
246. JEFFERSON, supra note 41, at 293. 
247. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
248. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court upheld the right of unmarried 
adults to use contraceptives free from intrusion by the state. 
249. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
250. 431 U.S. 628 (1977). My defense of Roe v. Wade, at this juncture, is a limited one. 
Much of the attack levelled against the abortion cases has centered on legitimacy. SeeR. BERGER, 
supra note 24; J. ELY, supra note 24; Schauer, supra note 53. The claim is that the right to choose 
whether to terminate a pregnancy is not lodged in the Constitution. A right of self-governance 
would thwart this illegitimacy argument. The right I have outlined, however, is presumptive. Obvi-
ously, the state's interest-protection of the fetus-in the abortion context is a powerful one. 
Whether the Court should have deferred to legislative efforts to protect potential life has not been 
my principal thrust here. Unlike most commentators, however, I do argue that the abortion issue 
is the Court's business. 
A tentative defense of the decision could be based upon the following lines. Constitutional 
interests in self-governance offer protection for the decision to terminate a pregnancy unless com-
pelling state concerns overcome the claim of autonomy. The governmental interest in regnlating 
abortion-protection of the fetus-is, at least in the early stages of pregnancy, difficult to measure. 
Determining whether a fetus is a "person," thereby justifying state intrusion, is essentially a non-
rational decision. Science and rational analysis may reveal much about the characteristics of a 
fetus at various stages of its growth. Technology may even advance the point at which the fetus can 
survive outside the womb. But science cannot settle the essentially moral issue of the fetus's status. 
If this is true, Roe v. Wade may reflect a justifiable conclusion that in the face of a constitu-
tional claim of autonomy it is impermissable for a state to take one side of a moral/religious 
dispute and demand that its citizens fall into line. If the "personhood" of the fetus cannot be 
demonstrated by rational, non-religious inquiry, no compelling justification exists to outweigh a 
woman's constitutipnally recognized interest in governing her own body. For a different conclu-
sion derived from similar premises, see Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking (forth-
coming in MICH. L. REv.). 
251. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1053 (Marshall, J., dissenting 
from denial of cert.). 
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sexual fornication, 252 would be embraced as well. Further, a right of 
self-governance would offer at least limited protection not only to vari-
ous lifestyle decisions like marriage253 and cohabitation, 254 but to an 
assortment of claims directly implicating individual self-determination 
as well, such as a right of a competent person to refuse medical or psy-
chological treatment, 255 or to die. 256 In all of these instances, substan-
tial prima facie showings can be made that government sanctions chal-
lenged interfere with an individual's ability to shape her life (or death) 
to suit her character without meaningful justification. Sanctions in 
these areas are, in that sense, potentially violative of one of the first 
premises of democratic government-that individuals are capable of 
making intelligent decisions about the direction of their lives. The de-
mand for moral equality, which secures space for the practice of auton-
omy by our fellows so long as no significant harm is threatened, is en-
dangered as well. 
Of course the principle I have defined paints with a very broad, if 
somewhat abstract, brush. It is easy enough to say that by experi-
menting in pre-marital sexual relationships, deciding whether or not to 
use contraceptives, or choosing to live with an extended family, one 
shapes and acts upon essential elements of her character. But John 
Hinkley's assassination attempt of President Ronald Reagan, however 
misguided it may have been, could probably be described in similar 
terms. Obviously, therefore, any claimed right of self-governance can 
be but presumptive257 in nature. Myriad choices, ranging from the 
"freedom" to smoke marijuana to the "liberty" to ride a motorcycle 
252. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), a.ff'd, 425 
U.S. I (1976) (upholding sodomy law against attack by consenting adult homosexuals). 
253. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 
(1970) (divorce); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). 
254. See supra note 251. · 
255. Consider, for example, indications of a constitutional "liberty interest in avoiding 
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs" in Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982). 
See also Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. N.J. 1978). 
256. The key here, of course, is competence. Compare In re Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 
N.E.2d 435 (1965) (competent adult may not be compelled to receive blood transfusion in face of 
contrary religious belief) with Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 
331 F.2d 1000, reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) 
(cireumstances suggesting individual lacked time or capacity for competent reflection concerning 
refusal to accept treatment). Seealsoln re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 
10, 335 A.2d 647 (1976). 
The autonomy right described here is based, in major part, upon a claimed societal commit-
ment to the belief in individual competence. Therefore, the right is much more difficult to apply to 
the claims of minors. Based on concepts of self-governance, Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional, 431 U.S. 628 (1977) (invalidating certain limitations on distribution of contraceptives to 
minors) is much more difficult to justify than Griswold. Also, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) 
(limiting parental consent requirement in abortion context) is more troubling than Roe v. Wade. 
257. See Henkin, supra note 236, at 1429, and Karst, supra note 240, at 627, for similar 
claims. 
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sans chapeau, come neatly within its grasp. 258 Reasonable measure-
ment of the scope of self-governance therefore, must examine both the 
dangers which the government regulation presents to attributes of indi-
viduality inherent in seltbood, and the values of health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare which the regulation may serve. 
Still, we are not left completely rudderless. Self-governance as-
sumes not only that individuals are competent to run their own lives, 
but that they are no less able than their fellows to determine what is the 
ideal life. Given these parameters, a right of self-governance might rea-
sonably be said to limit the advancement of various state regulatory 
aims. 
Much essentially paternalistic regulation is designed to minimize 
the threat of tangible harm. Seat belt laws, work safety regulations, and 
motorcycle helmet laws are examples. Such sanctions, to some de-
gree, 259 limit the individual's ability to shape and act upon aspects of 
her character. Yet the motivation for government intervention is to pre-
vent injury and the costs, both personal and societal, which necessarily 
result. Other examples of paternalistic legislation-anti-contraceptive 
laws, obscenity laws, fornication and homosexuality regulations, for 
example-seem largely designed to forcibly elevate the moral character 
of the citizenry. A right of self-governance is directly at odds with such 
governmental attempts to foster its own moral blueprint of the desir-
able life. Self-governance, therefore, cautions against government dic-
tates which proscribe activity because officials think it ignoble.260 A 
state's ability to suppress conduct which causes harm only in the eyes of 
a third party beholder would probably also be curtailed. 261 The 
Supreme Court has indicated as much by ruling that "the Constitution 
258. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (informational privacy); Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (private possession of obscene material for personal use); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterlization of certain felons); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) (child raising); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discharge from 
U.S. Navy for homosexual acts); Camohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980) (use of 
laetrile); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir. en bane), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) 
(hair style); King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(intrastate travel); Schuman v. Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979) (right to name 
child); Alaska v. Erickson, 574 P.2d I (Alaska 1978) (usc of cocaine); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 
310, 191 N.W. 2d 185 (1971) (homosexual marriage); People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 
149 (1969) (challenge to motorcycle helmet law); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (mari-
juana use). 
259. It could be questioned, of course, whether these sanctions limit "core" aspects of 
one's sense of character or identity as defined here. The point I seek to raise, however, is the 
tension between a self-governance interest and the acceptability of certain state regulatory inter-
ests typically offered to overcome autonomy claims. 
260. SeeR. DWORKIN, supra note 242, at 353-61. 
261. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (limiting power of government to 
confine non-dangerous persons); L. TRIBE, supra 209, at§§ 15-19, p. 981; Gerety, supra note 241, at 
279. 
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leaves matters of taste and style ... largely to the individual. " 262 If my 
choices about how to shape my life are to be valued, they should not be 
sanctionable merely because other equally sovereign individuals dislike 
them. Freedoms of speech and religion, of course, are premised upon 
similar theories. Other keys to analyzing the validity of state intrusions 
upon autonomy could be offered as well, 263 but my point here is not to 
measure the exact breadth of the constitutional right. It is rather to 
justify its existence. By exploring an American constitutional ethos re-
flected both in the text and in our identifiable aspirations as a people, I 
hope to show that the protection of concepts of self-governance is criti-
cal to our embrace of personal dignity and to democracy itself. 
A further clarification of terminology is essential. Thus far, I have 
spoken of a "right" or "interest" in self-governance in very loose terms. 
It has not escaped my attention, however, that such "rights talk" is a 
controversial enterprise. And it should be. Much confusion, 264 and 
perhaps even much deception, 265 takes place under various claims of 
right. In arguing that Americans enjoy, or at least that the Constitution 
envisions, a right of self-governance, I make no claim that such a right, 
natural or otherwise, hovers for our discovery like one of Plato's forms 
just beyond the presently distorted horizon. Nor do I think that there is, 
or should be, a right to self-governance in the "strong sense," as Profes-
sor Dworkin uses the term, meaning a liberty that can never be over-
come by the public good. 266 
I speak, rather, of rights as they appear to me to exist, or to be 
given solicitude, in the American constitutional system of the past half-
century. Modern life and government are perhaps too complex to coun-
tenance rights which are either categorical, formalistic, or absolute. 267 
The reality of United States Supreme Court decision-making instead 
amounts to the assertion of various values, deemed by the Justices to be 
constitutional in nature, against legislative or executive prerogative. 
When a challenged government action inhibits a constitutional value to 
a sufficient degree, the Court trumps majority will. Such values, or 
claims of right, are neither perfectly outcome determinative nor capable 
262. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (right to wear shirt with offensive 
declaration). 
263. See, e.g., G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 309-10 (1978); Gerety, 
supra note 241, at 236-66; Henkin, supra note 236; Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 275, 281 (1974). 
264. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 217, at 81-83. 
265. Tushnet, supra note 86, at 1371. See also Deigh, Book Review, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 
668 (1984); Hare, Arguing About Rights, 33 EMORY L.J. 631 (1984). 
266. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 215, at 269. 
267. See Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE PoLITICS OF LAw: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18-39 (D. Kairys, ed. 1982). 
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of being completely insulated from judicial manipulation. 268 Some may 
wish that the world of constitutional decision-making were more pris-
tine, but, happily to my mind, it is not. Constitutional law becomes 
predictable and provides essential stability only to the extent that pat-
terns of judicial treatment of these values-free expression, the right to 
equality, procedural fairness, and the rest-become ascertainable. 
Therefore, the central debate among constitutional theorists, not 
surprisingly, concerns the appropriate sources of constitutional val-
ues. 269 Some would limit judicial authority to the unambiguous dic-
tates of the text. 270 Others would go further, finding limits in the struc-
ture and functions of government. 271 A few would pose no limits at 
all. 272 For the most part, however, we correctly demand that the values 
which trigger judicial review justifiably be considered constitutional in 
nature. The most comfortable sources of judicially enforceable values, 
to be sure, are those lodged in the phrases of the text. The strict textual-
ists have at least this much right. But as I have tried to show above, that 
answer alone will not do. My assertion that we should enjoy a "right" 
to self-direction is merely a claim that the judicial cognizance of the 
value of self-governance in constitutional litigation is appropriate. 
B. Progress 
We think our civilization near its meridian, but we are yet 
only at the cock-crowing and the morning star. 273 
-RALPH WALDO EMERSON 
It seems perhaps a strange endeavor to seek the protection of mod-
ern privacy/autonomy interests-abortion, increased sexual autonomy, 
the right to die, and others-at the hands of Jefferson and Lincoln. In 
all probability, such particular interests were beyond their contempla-
tion. We may speculate as well that, representatives of their times as 
they were in other instances, they would have been personally unsym-
pathetic to such claims. Conceding as much, however, it does not fol-
low that the Jeffersonian concept of autonomy cannot be appropriately 
applied to unforeseen privacy interests. 
268. See Perry, Taking Neither Rights Talk Nor The "Critique of Rights" Too Seriously, 
62 TEx. L. REv. 1405 (1984). 
269. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 191, at 525-35; M. PERRY, supra note 36, at 97; Ely, The 
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
270. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 24; Bork, supra note 24; Monaghan, supra note 24; 
Rehnquist, supra note 24. 
271. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); J. ELY, 
supra note 24. 
272. See, e.g., P. BOBBITT, supra note 37; M. PERRY, supra note 36; Fiss, supra note 36. 
273. R.W. EMERSON, THE PORTABLE EMERSON 201 (C. Bode ed. 1963). 
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First, and perhaps obviously, self-governance sets forth a relation-
ship between the individual and the state, offering each a sphere of sov-
ereignty. If that relationship entrusts the individual with determining 
what is for himself the good life, the protective sphere remains even as 
the vision of the good life alters. Second, and perhaps more central to 
our understanding of an evolving concept of autonomy, Jeffersonian 
philosophy carries a heavy commitment to progress. 274 
To Jefferson, a child of the Enlightenment, the belief in human 
progress was central to political and intellectual thought. Citizens 
should be set free, and kept that way, in order to move forward in the 
light of ever-expanding knowledge. 27 5 As he explained: "laws and insti-
tutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As 
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are 
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the 
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace 
with the times."276 Lincoln echoed not only these sentiments277 but 
also the belief that the Declaration of Independence itself "contem-
plated the progressive improvement in the condition of all .... " 278 
Progress in the development of equality was hoped for by Jefferson, 279 
struggled for by Lincoln, and achieved in substantial part in our consti-
tutional order.280 The trend of our history, as John Ely has noted, has 
been "relentlessly away" from the elitism of early America. 281 The 
classes of persons considered autonomous, fully-participating members 
of our society, have been the subject of a steady, if painfully slow, 
expansion. 
Jefferson and Lincoln intended just as assuredly that the scope of 
personal autonomy would develop with society. Lincoln thought the 
Declaration's commitment to "liberty to all" was most pointed for fu-
ture use, its aspirations to be " ... labored for, ... constantly approxi-
274. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Ludlow (Sept. 6, 1824) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 583; H.S. CoMMANGER, supra note 90, at 113; D. MALONE, supra note 90, at xvi. 
275. D. 8ooRSTIN, supra note 90, at 239-45; D. MALONE, supra note 90, at 153-54. 
276. JEFFERSON, supra note 130, at 559. 
277. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 279, 361; SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 141, at 113. 
278. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 362. 
279. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814) in JEFFER-
SON, supra note 41, at 545 (letter concerning hopes for emancipation): 
I had always hoped that the younger generation receiving their early impressions after 
the flame of liberty had been kindled in every breast, and [had] become as it were the vital 
spirit of every American ... would have sympathized with oppression wherever found 
and proved their love of liberty beyond their own share of it ... yet the hour of 
emanicipation is advancing in the march of time. 
280. I note particularly the 13th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 24th and 26th amendments to the Fed-
eral Constitution. 
281. J. ELY, supra note 24, at 6. 
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mated."282 Jefferson, on the other hand, explained that advances in 
human knowledge would serve by "softening and correcting the man-
ners and morals of man .... " 283 He believed, therefore, that the adop-
tion of self-government would eventually thwart what he saw as the 
"awing [of] the human mind by stories of raw-head and bloody-bones 
to a distrust of its own vision .... " 284 As such "monkish ignorance and 
superstition" was discarded, 285 new frontiers of personal choice would 
be opened. The reactions of "laws and institutions" to the discovery of 
new truths must match the development of the mind. "Where this prog-
ress will stop," Jefferson wrote, "no one can say." Yet, in its wake "bar-
barism ... recedes before the steady step of amelioration." 286 
Jefferson foresaw that the visions of succeeding generations would 
be more experienced, more complex, and more enlightened than his 
own. Their problems and their solutions would be fashioned by their 
own wits. He would have assumed that after two centuries of the na-
tion's development the boundaries of personal autonomy would have 
been pushed well beyond those of his time and even his comfort. He 
sought to initiate a progressive development of individual liberty, 
breaking down barriers discovered to be artificial. 287 Such a philoso-
phy assumes that as old stereotypes are pierced, the realm of personal 
choice will be augmented. A society which once saw divine mandate in 
the subordination of women and blacks, the beating of school children, 
and the incarceration of adulterers might indeed recognize a "steady 
step of amelioration" and reverse its command. Nothing is more con-
sistent with Jeffersonian thought than that future autonomy struggles 
would be unforeseen and unforeseeable. The constant in this process, to 
Jefferson's way of thinking, would not be the particulars protected, but 
rather the commitment to self-determination. "Nothing," he believed, 
"is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man." 288 
282. LINCOLN, supra note 92, at 361. 
283. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Jan. II, 1816) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 550. 
284. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Eldridge Gerry (Jan. 26, 1799) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 478. 
285. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman (June 24, 1826) in JEFFERSON, 
supra note 41, at 585. 
286. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Ludlow (Sept. 6, 1824) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 583. 
287. See JEFFERSON, supra note 41. 
288. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824) in JEFFERSON, supra 
note 41, at 581. 
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V. CONCLUSION: INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 
The poet forms the consistence of what is to be from what 
has been and is ... [h]e places himself where future be-
comes the present. 289 
-WALT WHITMAN 
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For Jefferson and Lincoln, "self-governance" provides the foun-
dation for our system of government, pre-dating the framing and "en-
twining itself more closely about the human heart." 290 Still, it is obvi-
ously a difficult step to move from their efforts to set the course of the 
nation to the recognition of explicit interests in modern constitutional 
law. The ninth amendment opens a door for the argument through its 
embrace of unlisted rights and its concern that the specific guarantees 
are not stated with the requisite breadth. But only if constitutional deci-
sion-making is appropriately seen as an aspect of societal self-definition 
can the leap from political commitment to constitutional law be suc-
cessfully managed. 
Sanford Levinson has written that we must "recognize the extent 
to which discussions of constitutional theory implicate the very notion 
of our identity as Americans, [and] more particularly, our relationship 
to our national past." 291 That is the case, it seems to me, because the 
interpretation of our national charter is inextricably mixed with the in-
terpretation of our national tradition. Constitutional interpretation is, 
in this sense, a "mediation of the past and present,"292 drawing from 
our heritage, seeking to reaffirm and re-create central societal values. It 
is unavoidable that Supreme Court adjudication serves to some extent 
to "shape people's vision of their Constitution and of themselves."293 
If that shaping reflects only the predilections of the Justices, we are 
rightly concerned about legitimacy. It is not the job of the judiciary to 
create an American ethos out of whole cloth. But judicial efforts to 
measure the phrases of the Constitution in response to the ''founding, 
constitutive aspirations" of the American political tradition are not sub-
ject to the same charges of usurpation. 294 They instead build upon 
David Richards' suggestion that "constitutional interpretation 
289. Preface toW. WHITMAN, LEAVFS OF GRASS (1855). 
290. 4 LINCOLN WORKS, supra note 161, at 169. 
291. Levinson, Book Review, 59 TEX. L. REv. 395, 419 (1981). 
292. D. TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION 99 (1981). 
293. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227,238 (1972). 
294. Perry, supra note 38, at 563. 
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delve[s] into the history and nature oflarger cultural and political tradi-
tions, which constitutionalism expresses."295 
It is here that I think the work of Michael Perry has proven partic-
ularly useful. Perry argues that aggressive, non-textual or non-original-
ist review can be justified by an American founding commitment to 
moral evolution. 296 Tempering judicial authority through congres-
sional control over federal jurisdiction, Perry stakes a claim for sub-
stantive as well as process-based review. 297 I find Perry's ultimate con-
clusion troubling. I am unsure of his use of the American commitment 
to moral evolution largely because I am unsure what that means. Moral 
evolution, as a justification for constitutional decision-making, is a bit 
of a loose cannon. The demands of moral evolution in, for example, the 
teenage contraceptive cases, the abortion cases, or even the school 
prayer cases are, to me, unfathomable. Nor does it seem necessary, or 
advisable, to turn so completely from the text of the Constitution. 
Yet Perry presents strong claims that our national commitment is 
far more extensive than the specific dictates of the Constitution, and 
that the process of constitutional decision-making must be sufficiently 
broad to encompass societal attempts at self-definition. National judg-
ment or societal commitment, if it can be discovered, may provide a 
"source of values ... that can serve as a reservoir of decisional norms in 
human rights cases." 298 It is ostrich-like, of course, to insist that the 
line between national commitment and judicial whim is a bright one. 
But it is exactly the same shade as the line which separates legitimacy 
from usurpation. It can be claimed with the utmost ease, of course, that 
Jefferson and Lincoln do not speak for the people of the United States. 
But unless that argument retreats to a claim that nothing short of the 
positive enactment of a constitutional provision can help to reveal the 
American constitutional ethos-a claim precluded by the ninth amend-
ment-turning to Jefferson and Lincoln seems sound. 
Mark Tushnet has argued that "rights-talk often conceals a claim 
that things ought to be different within an argument that things are as 
the claimant contends."299 There is much truth in Tushnet's point. I 
make no claim here, however, that a right of self-governance has been 
given consistent protection by the Court. Nor do I argue that the text of 
the Constitution or reasonable analogies which can be drawn therefrom 
demand the acknowledgment of such a right. Nor even is it my position 
295. Richards, supra note 75, at 548. See also, E. Rosrow, THE SoVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: 
THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE QUFST FOR LAW 93-94 (1962) ("Constitutional interpretation re-
quire[s) a judge to be thoroughly steeped in the history and public life of the country"). 
296. M. PERRY, supra note 36, at 97-103. 
297. /d. at 91-145. 
298. /d. at 97. 
299. Tushnet, supra note 86, at 1371. 
1985:1305 Children of Distant Fathers 1357 
that the only possible reading of our history as a nation is one that 
reveals commitment to the progressive enhancement of autonomy in 
moral choice. My claim is rather that the best among us, through their 
public acts and declarations, have tried to commit us to that course. 
Our obligation as an "interpretive community"300 is to explore our po-
litical tradition searching for resources helpful in fulfilling the central 
aspirations of the nation. The record of performance has been far less 
than ideal. Yet, despite the strident claims of modern pundits, when the 
Court fosters individual autonomy, it draws upon what Martin Luther 
King, Jr. described as "those great wells of democracy that were dug 
deep by the founding fathers in the Declaration of Independence and 
the Constitution."301 
300. This is Stanley Fish's term. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TExT THis CLASS?: THE Aunt:OR-
ITY OF IN"mRPRETIVB CoMMUNITIES (1980). 
301. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at Masonic Temple, Memphis, Tennessee (Apr. 3, 
1968) in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 224 (F. Schulke ed. 1976). 

